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ARTICLES 
FAIR OR FOUL?:  SEC ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
THROUGH REMOVAL LEGISLATION 
Joseph A. Grundfest* 
 
The staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the 
Commission”) ignited a firestorm when it announced plans to shift 
litigation from federal courts to its internal administrative proceedings.  
Critics complain that the SEC’s administrative proceedings are 
fundamentally unfair and give the agency a “home-court” advantage.  They 
complain of discovery restrictions, the rapid pace at which hearings 
proceed, the admissibility of hearsay testimony, the absence of juries, the 
fact that administrative law judges (ALJs) and the Commission’s 
enforcement division are all paid by the Commission, the fact that appeals 
from ALJ rulings are initially to the Commission that initiated the 
proceeding, and myriad other procedural critiques.  Critics also observe 
that the Commission’s insistence on Chevron deference to its administrative 
decisions, combined with this shift to administrative proceedings, could, 
over time, dramatically reduce the federal judiciary’s role in the 
interpretation of the federal securities laws.  
This Article catalogues the long list of criticisms of the Commission’s 
administrative proceedings.  It also evaluates data describing the outcome 
of litigated matters and finds that, with the exception of insider trading 
cases, the Commission has an exceptionally high and statistically 
indistinguishable record of success in administrative and federal court 
proceedings alike.  The data thus seem not to support the view that the 
Commission has a generalized home-court advantage in administrative 
proceedings.  Nonetheless, the Commission’s virtually unfettered discretion 
in forum selection decisions, when it can assign cases to a forum that it 
controls, raises a plethora of institutional design concerns. 
While legislation designed to cut back dramatically on the number of 
proceedings litigated in the administrative forum has been introduced in 
Congress, this Article suggests that a more nuanced policy response may be 
appropriate.  Cases litigated by the SEC can be divided into three 
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categories.  Some, such as insider trading matters, are better resolved in 
federal court and can be presumptively assigned to that forum unless the 
defendant consents to an administrative proceeding.  Others, such as late 
filing cases, raise technical issues that can be presumptively assigned to the 
administrative forum.  The third category, composed of cases that fit neither 
presumptive category, could proceed in the administrative forum subject to 
a respondent’s right to petition for discretionary removal to federal court 
following a procedure modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).  
The federal judiciary would thus be able to act as a monitor, controlling the 
SEC’s exercise of discretion in its forum selection decisions and providing 
respondents with a means to challenge those determinations.  Indeed, in 
this capacity, federal court review would create new institutional incentives 
that could induce the Commission to modernize its internal procedures so 
that federal courts would be more likely to perceive those procedures as 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the 
Commission”) often can choose between two forums when it files 
enforcement actions.1  One option is to sue in federal district court, where 
 
 1. See, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191, at *2 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) (“The Commission has authority to pursue alleged violators of the 
securities laws by filing a civil suit in the federal district court or by instituting a civil 
administrative action.”); SEC, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELECTION 
IN CONTESTED ACTIONS 1 (2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-
approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf (“The Commission generally is authorized 
to bring its enforcement actions in either of two forums—a civil action in federal district 
court or a Commission administrative proceeding (and/or cease-and-desist proceeding) 
before an Administrative Law Judge—though it has authority to proceed on certain charges 
or remedies in only one of those forums.”) [https://perma.cc/A7YQ-3464]; Alexander I. 
Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings:  Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (2015) 
(“After an investigation reveals a securities law violation, the SEC can refer a matter to the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for consideration of criminal charges, file a civil lawsuit in 
federal district court, or commence an [administrative proceeding].”).  For a discussion of 
situations in which the Commission must bring its actions as administrative proceedings or 
in federal court, see infra notes 2 and 4.  For a discussion of the effects of section 929(b) of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“the Dodd-Frank Act”), 
which expands the scope of remedies available to the Commission in its administrative 
proceedings, see infra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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defendants have a right to a jury trial, can take depositions, and testimony is 
subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence.2  Federal district court judges are 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.3  They are 
independent of the Commission. 
Alternatively, the Commission can file an administrative proceeding that 
is heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ).  There is no right to a jury 
trial in an administrative proceeding.4  Discovery is severely restricted, 
depositions are limited, hearings proceed on a schedule that is far more 
rapid than in most federal trials, and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not 
apply.5  Prosecutors and ALJs in administrative proceedings are all 
Commission employees.6  Initial appeals from ALJ rulings are to the 
Commission itself, the same body that issued the order instituting the 
proceeding.  The Commission review of an ALJ’s decision is de novo.  
Thus, the Commission has the ability to both increase and decrease the 
sanctions imposed by the ALJ, in addition to the ability to reverse the ALJ’s 
decision.7  Only after the Commission rules on the appeal does a respondent 
 
 2. In some instances, the Commission must seek relief in federal court because no 
effective remedy is available through the administrative process.  For example, if the 
Commission seeks prejudgment relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or an 
order freezing assets, the Commission must resort to federal court because administrative 
law judges (ALJs) lack the authority to issue such orders. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., SEC Div. 
of Enf’t, Keynote Speech at New York City Bar 4th Annual White Collar Institute (May 12, 
2015) [hereinafter Ceresney, Keynote Speech], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-
nyc-bar-4th-white-collar-key-note.html [https://perma.cc/LG9X-SKTS].  “[L]iability as a 
controlling person or as a relief defendant can [also] only be pursued in district court 
actions.” Id. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President “shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States”). 
 4. Some statutes require an administrative hearing before an ALJ. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78l(j) (2012) (discussing proceedings to suspend or terminate the registration of public 
companies for failure to file periodic reports); id. § 78o(b)(4) (stating that follow-on 
proceedings to bar persons or entities from the securities industry must be pursued 
administratively).  “Charges of failure to supervise or” of “causing another person’s 
violation” of the securities laws “can only be pursued in the administrative forum.” 
Ceresney, Keynote Speech, supra note 2.  The SEC has used administrative proceedings as 
an alternative to federal court litigation since the SEC’s inception. See, e.g., Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. 78a–78pp) (creating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); id. §§ 19(a), 22, 
48 Stat. at 898, 901 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d) (authorizing the Commission 
to deny, suspend, or withdraw registrations “after appropriate notice and opportunity for 
hearing”); Andrew Ceresney, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf’t, Remarks to the American Bar 
Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Ceresney, 
Remarks to the ABA], https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297 
(noting that the SEC has “been using administrative proceedings throughout the 42-year 
history of the Division of Enforcement, and the Commission used them even before its 
enforcement activities were consolidated in one division”) [https://perma.cc/3JLL-U9AB]. 
 5. For a detailed discussion of the differences between federal court procedures and 
procedures in administrative proceedings, see infra Part I. 
 6. For critiques of the ALJ’s independence and competence, see infra Part I. 
 7. See, e.g., Aesoph, Exchange Act Release No. 78490, 2016 WL 4176930 (Aug. 5, 
2016).  The Commission imposed bans on the right to appear or practice before the 
Commission with a right to requalify in three years and two years, respectively; whereas the 
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gain the right to be heard by a federal judge unaffiliated with the 
Commission—a step that requires an appeal from the Commission’s ruling 
to a federal circuit court of appeals.8  The Commission is hardly alone in its 
administration of an internal judicial system; many other federal agencies 
operate similar adjudicatory bodies in which respondents’ rights materially 
diverge from the rights available in federal court proceedings.9 
The debate over the fairness of the Commission’s administrative 
procedures, and over the discretion the Commission exercises when 
allocating litigation between federal and administrative venues, ran at a low 
simmer for decades with only occasional outbursts.10  However, this 
relative calm ended in 2013, when the Commission’s staff announced plans 
to rely on expanded administrative remedies created by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act11 (“the Dodd-Frank Act”) 
 
ALJ’s decision provided for a right to reapply in one year and six months, respectively. Id. at 
*2. 
 8. For critiques of the appeals procedures in SEC administrative proceedings, see infra 
Part I. 
 9. More than thirty federal agencies employ administrative law judges. See Agencies 
Employing Administrative Law Judges, ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES, https://www.aalj.org/ 
agencies-employing-administrative-law-judges (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
P5L8-4FZZ]; see also David T. Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
1155, 1202 (2016) (“[M]any other agencies use ALJs to adjudicate claims that would 
otherwise come within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”); Peter J. Henning, Reforming 
the S.E.C.’s Administrative Process, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/10/27/business/dealbook/reforming-the-secs-administrative-process.html (“If [the 
Commission’s administrative] system somehow deprives respondents of a measure of due 
process, then can’t the same be said for other agencies—like the Federal Trade Commission 
and banking regulators—that use the same means to police the industries in their 
jurisdiction?”) [https://perma.cc/2ANE-KLKK]. 
 10. For examples of longstanding criticisms of the Commission’s internal processes, see 
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., 1 ACUS 571. RECOMMENDATION NO. 21:  DISCOVERY IN AGENCY 
ADJUDICATION (1970) (advocating for broadened discovery in SEC administrative 
proceedings); Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of Task Force on the SEC 
Administrative Law Judge Process, 47 BUS. LAW. 1731, 1731 (1992) (urging an SEC task 
force to consider and recommend procedural reforms to administrative proceedings “aimed 
at improving the fairness of SEC administrative proceedings”); Robert A. Downing & 
Richard L. Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774, 782 
(1979) (criticizing SEC proceedings “where the SEC is not only the investigator but the 
prosecutor and judge as well”); Arthur F. Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC 
Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 251 (1980) (“This lack 
of formal pretrial discovery rights remains one of the low points in the otherwise fair SEC 
administrative adjudicatory procedures.”). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  Prior to adoption of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Commission could seek monetary penalties only in administrative actions against 
regulated entities (brokerage firms, investment advisers, and investment companies) and 
persons associated with regulated entities. See Kenneth B. Winer & Laura S. Kwaterski, 
Assessing SEC Power in Administrative Proceedings, LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:47 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/233299/assessing-sec-power-in-administrative-proceedings 
[https://perma.cc/HT24-CBYT].  In 2009, the Commission sought to expand its powers by 
requesting from Congress the authority to order monetary penalties in cease-and-desist 
proceedings filed in the administrative forum. See SEC’s “Wish List” of 42 Changes It Seeks 
in the Federal Securities Laws, SEC. DOCKET (July 16, 2009, 2:48 PM), 
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2009/07/16/sec-s-wish-list-of-42-changes-it-seeks-in-the-
federal-securities-laws/ [https://perma.cc/C85A-C28P].  Congress granted this request when 
it passed section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended section 8A of the 
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and to shift litigation that had traditionally been brought in federal court to 
its in-house administrative proceedings.12 
This announcement kicked over a hornet’s nest of protest as critics 
trumpeted a long list of complaints about the fairness of the SEC’s internal 
process and its Kafkaesque dimensions.13  They pointed to data suggesting 
 
Securities Act, section 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, section 9(d)(1) of the 
Investment Company Act, and section 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act, to permit 
the imposition of civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings, in addition to the 
cease-and-desist orders previously available to the Commission. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1862–64 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (2012)).  The Dodd-Frank Act gave the 
Commission broad authority to impose a civil penalty in an administrative proceeding 
against any person or company, including unregistered entities and individuals. See id.  The 
Commission can now obtain through internal administrative proceedings essentially most of 
the remedies it might obtain in federal court. See Ceresney, Keynote Speech, supra note 2 
(“As part of Dodd-Frank, Congress expanded the SEC’s authority to obtain penalties against 
any person in an administrative proceeding including unregistered entities and individuals.  
Under this expanded authority, the Commission has been bringing more enforcement actions 
in the administrative forum, where it can now obtain the same remedies as in district 
court.”); Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 (noting the expanded authority to 
obtain civil penalties permitted under section 929P(a) and noting that the SEC “is simply 
making use of the administrative forum in cases where we previously could only obtain 
penalties in district court”). 
 12. In late 2013, SEC Director of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney stated, “Our 
expectation is that we will be bringing more administrative proceedings given the recent 
statutory changes [enacted through the Dodd-Frank Act].” Gretchen Morgenson, At the 
S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-court-edge.html 
[https://perma.cc/5R5Z-T9K3].  In June 2014, Ceresney told a D.C. Bar audience that the 
SEC would choose the administrative forum more often in insider trading cases and other 
cases that traditionally had been heard by a federal judge or jury. See Brian Mahoney, SEC 
Could Bring More Insider Trading Cases In-House, LAW360 (June 11, 2014, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/547183/sec-could-bring-more-insider-trading-cases-in-
house [https://perma.cc/KDU5-WUDD].  The Commission was perceived as fulfilling this 
commitment in 2014 when it filed two contested insider trading cases as administrative 
proceedings. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-
judges-it-appoints-1413849590 [https://perma.cc/7XLP-KRLJ].  In October 2014, Ceresney 
also told the Wall Street Journal that “[w]e’re using administrative proceedings more 
extensively,” while Kara Brockmeyer, head of the Commission’s Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA) unit, described administrative proceedings as “the new normal.” Id.  In late 
2014, the Commission took steps to prepare for an increased administrative caseload by 
adding two new ALJs, bringing the total to five. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces 
New Hires in the Office of Administrative Law Judges (June 30, 2014), http:// 
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542202073 [https://perma.cc/9E 
XX-HMNW].   
 13. See, e.g., Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th 
Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of Scott Garrett, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov. 
Sponsored Enters.) (commenting that the administrative process illustrates a “very troubling 
pattern of the SEC’s attempting to stack the rules and process in a way that the outcome of 
the case is, well, predetermined”); Tanya J. Dmitronow & Scott J. Fishwick, Critics 
Question SEC’s Increasing Use of Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/critics-question-sec-s-increasing-use-
administrative-enforcement-proceedings (discussing criticism of the Commission’s recent 
shift to the administrative forum) [https://perma.cc/MW2Z-LUMG]; Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. 
Faces Challenges over the Constitutionality of Some of Its Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES:  
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that the Commission enjoyed a significant home-court advantage when 
litigating before its own ALJs14 and challenged the constitutionality of the 
process by which the Commission appointed its ALJs.15  Critics also waxed 
poetic about the Commission’s internal procedures as an affront to the 
principles of due process that can be traced back to the Magna Carta.16  It 
was as though a dam holding back pent up rage about the fairness of the 
Commission’s administrative proceedings had suddenly burst. 
The Commission then doubled down.  In a controversial opinion, the 
Commission overruled a rare ALJ decision favoring the respondent and, in 
so doing, emphasized the need for Chevron deference17 to the SEC’s 
interpretation of the federal securities laws.18  The Commission’s opinion 
was subsequently vacated on appeal by the First Circuit, but the policy 
damage was done.19  Federal judges and other observers warned that the 
SEC was embarking on a path that would fundamentally alter the common 
law process that had governed the interpretation of the federal securities 
 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-
challenges-over-the-constitutionality-of-some-of-its-court-proceedings/ (noting that “a recent 
push by the agency to bring more cases before its administrative law judges rather than filing 
charges in federal district court is drawing increased attacks from defense lawyers claiming 
that the entire process is not just unfair, but also unconstitutional”) [https://perma.cc/LT4R-
EWTQ]; William McLucas & Matthew Martens, How to Rein in the SEC, WALL ST. J. (June 
2, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-rein-in-the-sec-1433285747 
(observing that “[o]ver the past year or so, commentators, judges, the defense bar and 
Congress have assailed efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission to move more of 
its enforcement actions out of federal court and into the agency’s in-house hearings”) 
[https://perma.cc/8ZFH-FPM8]; Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the “SEC 
Speaks” Conference 2015:  A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html (“Commission staff has recently 
indicated that they will recommend instituting more enforcement matters, including insider 
trading cases, through administrative proceedings rather than going through the federal 
district courts. . . .  [T]his change has the appearance of the Commission looking to improve 
its chances of success by moving cases to its in-house administrative system.”) 
[https://perma.cc/D5EF-GXHX]; see also infra Part I. 
 14. For an analysis and critique of these data, see infra Part III. 
 15. For a brief summary of this constitutional litigation, see infra note 99. 
 16. Philip Hamburger, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., 2015 Walter Berns Constitution 
Day Lecture:  The Magna Carta, Due Process, and Administrative Power (Sept. 17, 2015), 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/The-Magna-Carta-Due-Process-and-
Administrative-Power.pdf [https://perma.cc/346X-KE55]. 
 17. Chevron deference refers to the standard laid out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See infra note 83. 
 18. See Flannery, Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73840, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3981, Investment Company Act Release No. 31374, 
2014 WL 7145625, at *15–18 (Dec. 15, 2014) (overturning an ALJ decision that found 
respondents not liable on all claims, purporting to resolve many interpretive questions 
concerning the scope of antifraud liability that arose in the wake of Janus Capital Group v. 
First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), and making a bid for Chevron deference 
from the courts for its interpretations by first asserting that there is “ambiguity in Section 
10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a)” and then claiming that its interpretations are 
“informed by [the SEC’s] experience and expertise in administering the securities laws”), 
rev’d, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015); see also infra note 94.  
 19. Flannery, 810 F.3d at 4 (vacating the Commission’s ruling and concluding “that the 
Commission’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence”); see also infra note 95. 
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laws for decades.20  Instead of federal courts serving as full and active, 
indeed, sometimes dominant, partners in the evolution of the federal 
securities laws, the SEC’s new regime would greatly expand the 
Commission’s ability to control the evolution of the law:  the number of 
securities law cases subject to interpretation by the federal courts would be 
diminished as the Commission shifted more litigation to the administrative 
forum.  Federal courts would then be limited to resolving securities law 
issues primarily as raised in private civil actions and federal criminal cases.  
And, in both of those categories, the Commission would insist on Chevron 
deference to its prior administrative rulings.  All of this would marginalize 
the role of the Article III judiciary and elevate the importance of the 
Commission itself and of its ALJs in controlling the evolution of the federal 
securities laws. 
Congress has also entered the fray with two legislative proposals.  The 
Due Process Restoration Act21 would provide a mandatory right of removal 
to certain respondents in administrative proceedings and would raise the 
burden of proof for some cases to a “clear and convincing evidence” 
standard.22  The full Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of 
Representatives approved this proposed legislation in early 2016.23  Around 
 
 20. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Judge, S.D.N.Y, Keynote Address at PLI Securities 
Regulation Institute:  Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law Unto Itself? 11 (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://assets.law360news.com/0593000/593644/Sec.Reg.Inst.final.pdf (noting that 
administrative interpretation of the securities laws—a task historically borne by federal 
courts—“would not be good for the impartial development of the law in an area of immense 
practical importance” and is “unlikely . . . to lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial 
interpretations as would result from having those cases brought in federal court”) 
[https://perma.cc/HBW2-Y35M]; see also CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
ENFORCEMENT:  RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 19 (2015) 
[hereinafter CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT] (suggesting that “[t]he Commission should 
resist utilizing its administrative forum for [the purpose of superseding a judicial opinion 
with which it disagrees] in the absence of compelling circumstances making such an effort 
an appropriate use of its Dodd-Frank-granted choice of forum capabilities”); Andrew 
Vollmer, SEC Revanchism and the Expansion of Primary Liability Under Section 17(a) and 
Rule 10b-5, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 273, 278 (2016) (“The cumulative effect of an agency’s 
decision to roll back Supreme Court precedent and to consolidate for itself ultimate decision-
making power over questions of law traditionally left to the courts would seriously alter the 
balance of responsibility between agencies and courts long recognized in our system of 
government.”). 
 21. H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (2015).  This bill would allow a respondent, against whom 
the Commission seeks a cease-and-desist order and monetary penalty, to require termination 
of his or her administrative proceeding, at which point the Commission could choose to 
refile charges in federal court. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-697, at 1 (2016) (“The Committee on Financial Services, to 
whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3798) to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 . . . report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do 
pass.”); Janet Levaux, House Bill to Weaken SEC Enforcement Moves Ahead, 
THINKADVISOR (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/03/02/house-bill-to-
weaken-sec-enforcement-moves-ahead [https://perma.cc/9WSE-JSX9].  The bill’s 
potentially broad chilling effect on the Commission’s enforcement program has been broadly 
noted. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 9 (“If it was a mistake to give the S.E.C. such broad 
authority to bring administrative cases, then using an indirect measure like Mr. Garrett’s 
1150 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
that same time, the Republican chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee unveiled a second legislative proposal, the Financial CHOICE 
Act.24  This proposal would also give respondents in SEC administrative 
proceedings the right to remove the enforcement action to federal court and 
would repeal the practice of judicial deference to SEC interpretation.25 
The Commission has responded with a vigorous defense of its internal 
proceedings as fair and efficient and has urged that its ALJs are unbiased.26  
The Commission also has emphasized its expertise, and the expertise of its 
ALJs, in interpreting the federal securities laws.27  Indeed, a large body of 
precedent supports the formal legitimacy of the administrative proceedings 
of the sort relied upon by the Commission.28 
 
proposal to raise the burden of proof that will keep almost every case out of the 
administrative process seems like a blunderbuss solution to a narrow problem.”); David 
Zaring, The Due Process Restoration Act of 2015 Would Kill Administrative Adjudication at 
the SEC, CONGLOMERATE (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2015/11/the-due-
process-restoration-act-of-2015-would-kill-administrative-adjudication-at-the-secnd-.html 
(suggesting that Mr. Garrett’s bill “would basically kill things for SEC ALJs”) 
[https://perma.cc/SU83-TT22]; Letter from Americans for Fin. Reform, to Congress (Mar. 2, 
2016), http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/03/due-process-restoration-act/ (urging members of 
Congress to oppose the Due Process Restoration Act because it “would make it more 
difficult for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to hold companies accountable 
when they break the law—even as those same firms frequently deny basic due process to 
their investors and customers through forced arbitration”) [https://perma.cc/GA7E-5NZQ]. 
 24. See generally H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT, CREATING 
HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR INVESTORS, CONSUMERS, AND ENTREPRENEURS (2016) 
[hereinafter THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT], http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
financial_choice_act_comprehensive_outline.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AXN-NDYZ].  The 
Financial CHOICE Act would, among other changes, roll back many of the regulations 
imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act and other postcrisis regulatory initiatives, end “too big to 
fail” and bank bailouts, and impose enhanced penalties for financial fraud and self-dealing, 
including by enhancing the penalty powers of the SEC. See id. at 2–16.  This bill has been 
criticized for substantially increasing penalties, see J.W. Verret, Where the Financial 
CHOICE Act Goes Wrong, FORBES (July 19, 2016, 9:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/realspin/2016/07/19/financial-choice-act-goes-wrong/#1e92cf1b6f90 [https://perma.cc/ 
45KS-4SUL], and for “open[ing] the door to certain risky business practices that helped 
contribute to the financial crisis,” Andrew Soergel, Hensarling’s Dodd-Frank Kryptonite 
Draws Mixed Response, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 7, 2016, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-07/hensarlings-dodd-frank-kryptonite-draws-
mixed-response [https://perma.cc/E566-E3DS]. 
 25. See THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT, supra note 24. 
 26. See, e.g., Ceresney, Keynote Speech, supra note 2 (“I believe both federal district 
court and administrative proceedings are fair forums.”); Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, 
supra note 4 (indicating that the “administrative forum is eminently proper, appropriate, and 
fair to respondents”); SEC, Investor Advisory Committee Meeting (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/otherwebcasts/2015/investor-advisory-committee-101515.shtml 
(Andrew Ceresney, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, remarking, “I think 
generally, from our perspective, the [administrative proceeding] is a fair forum, 
notwithstanding that it has different procedures than a district court.”) 
[https://perma.cc/L842-78KC]. 
 27. See infra Part I. 
 28. See supra note 1 (observing that administrative proceedings have been used as an 
alternative to federal court litigation since the SEC’s creation); see also Raymond J. Lucia 
Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191, at *3–4 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) (recognizing 
the long history of SEC administrative proceedings).  Further, “[t]here is long-settled 
authority upholding the SEC administrative enforcement regime against constitutional 
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Each side of the debate has relied on empirical data to support its 
position.  Critics interpret the data as suggesting that the Commission has a 
home-field advantage in administrative proceedings.29  Critics also suggest 
that the Commission seeks to bring more cases in-house in order to prevail 
on claims that might not succeed if brought in federal court.30  The 
Commission responds with data indicating that there are no material 
differences in its success rate in administrative and federal court 
proceedings.31  However, the data regarding the Commission’s win-loss 
record is more nuanced than either side suggests.  The Commission fares 
relatively poorly in insider trading litigation both in federal court and before 
its own ALJs.  More precisely, the Commission prevailed in only eight of 
the fifteen (53 percent) insider trading cases resolved in fiscal years 2014, 
2015, and 2016—through March 4, 2016.32  The SEC also lost the single 
insider trading case brought before an ALJ during that period.33  But when 
insider trading cases are excluded from the analysis, the Commission attains 
a high success rate regardless of whether it litigates in the administrative or 
federal forum:  it prevails in 97 percent of cases litigated before ALJs and in 
96 percent of cases litigated in federal court, with this difference being 
statistically indistinguishable.34  However, this data must be interpreted 
with caution because selection bias makes it difficult to draw reasonable 
inferences from win-loss ratios, even if statistically significant differences 
arise across administrative and federal forums, which is not the case. 
The data regarding the forums in which the Commission files settled 
matters do, however, show a remarkable shift toward the administrative 
forum.  In fiscal year 2013, the Commission filed 35 percent of its settled 
matters involving publicly traded companies in an administrative forum.35  
In fiscal years 2014 and 2015, the percentage of actions filed against 
publicly traded issuers in the administrative forum had more than doubled 
 
challenge—even when finding the SEC has made a mistake within it.” Thomas K. Potter III, 
A Renewed Fight Over SEC’s Admin Forum Constitutionality, LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:30 
AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/585756/a-renewed-fight-over-sec-s-admin-forum-
constitutionality [https://perma.cc/ZSQ9-ZUFN]; see also Zaring, supra note 9, at 1159–60 
(“Formal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which is the process 
that SEC ALJs offer, has been with us for decades and has never before been thought to be 
unconstitutional in any way.  It violates no rights, nor offends the separation of powers; if 
anything, scholars have bemoaned the fact that it offers an inefficiently large amount of 
process to defendants, administered by insulated civil servants who in no way threaten the 
President’s control over the Executive Branch.”); infra note 76 (noting that the Seventh 
Amendment does not bar adjudication of disputes in an administrative forum). 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See Bolan, Jr., Release No. 877, 2015 WL 5316569 (ALJ Sept. 14, 2015) 
(dismissing claims brought administratively against a former Wells Fargo trader), review 
granted by Ruggieri, Securities Act Release No. 9985, Exchange Act Release No. 76614, 
2015 WL 8519533 (Dec. 10, 2015). 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. See NYU POLLACK CTR. & CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY 
AGAINST PUBLIC COMPANY DEFENDANTS:  FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, at 5 fig. 4 (2016). 
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to 75 percent.36  Critics complain that this shift demonstrates that the 
Commission favors administrative proceedings because of a home-court 
advantage.  In reality, however, these data are exceptionally difficult to 
interpret because of an identification problem.  Respondents have incentives 
to prefer administrative settlements over federal injunctions, and the 
dramatic post-Dodd-Frank shift to administrative settlement therefore may 
reflect respondent preferences at least as much as the Commission’s 
agenda.  The inference of home-court advantage based on these settlement 
data could therefore be ill founded. 
But none of this is to suggest that the choice of forum is a matter of 
indifference.  For example, with regard to the law of insider trading, the 
Commission has made it clear that it disagrees with the Second Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Newman,37 which held that the personal benefit 
necessary to establish tippee liability must be pecuniary in nature.38  The 
Commission’s decision in Flannery39 makes clear that its interpretation of 
Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders,40 differs from the 
interpretation adopted by several lower courts.41  And, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has, on more than one occasion, rejected the Commission’s favored 
interpretation of federal securities laws.42 
However, the Commission has not been entirely deaf to complaints about 
its administrative procedures.  For example, the Commission has recently 
amended its Rules of Practice to allow for a limited number of depositions 
in administrative proceedings and to extend the timeline for some of its 
hearings.43  These concessions were quickly criticized as too modest and 
 
 36. See id. 
 37. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 38. See, e.g., Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 1–2, United 
States v. Newman, No. 13-1837, 2015 WL 1954058 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (arguing that the 
Second Circuit’s ruling in Newman was “directly at odds with Supreme Court and prior 
Second Circuit decisions” and “creates uncertainty about the precise type of benefit that the 
panel believes an insider who tips confidential information must receive to be liable”). 
 39. Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73840, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3981, Investment Company Act Release No. 31374, 2014 WL 
7145625 (Dec. 15, 2014), rev’d, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 40. 564 U.S. 135 (2011). 
 41. See supra note 18; infra note 94.  The First Circuit’s decision in Flannery v. SEC, 
810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015), to vacate the Commission’s opinion was based on a finding that 
the factual record could not support the SEC’s decision and expressed no view regarding the 
Commission’s legal interpretation. See id. at 4.  Because the Commission’s decision was 
vacated, the Commission’s legal analysis has no precedential effect. See, e.g., O’Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975) (“Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect . . . .”); Durning 
v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] decision that has been 
vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.”).  Nonetheless, the record is clear that, 
given the opportunity, the Commission is willing to part with federal courts on matters of 
legal interpretation. 
 42. See infra note 97. 
 43. For a discussion of these amendments, see infra Part II. 
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unresponsive to the fundamental flaws inherent in the administrative 
process.44 
In defending its shift to administrative proceedings, the Commission also 
points to section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.45  That provision, for the 
first time, grants the SEC authority to impose civil penalties on 
nonregulated entities in administrative proceedings.46  The Commission can 
easily reason that Congress would not grant it this expansive new authority 
unless Congress intended that the Commission exercise this authority 
precisely by suing a larger number of alleged violators in administrative 
proceedings rather than in federal court.47  Otherwise, what purpose would 
the legislative grant serve?  From this perspective, the Commission’s 
expanded emphasis on administrative proceedings is entirely consistent 
with congressional intent. 
More fundamentally still, the U.S. litigation process commonly confers 
on plaintiffs a first-mover advantage in selecting a litigation forum.48  
Private party plaintiffs regularly search for the forum in which they have the 
best chance of prevailing, as do federal and state prosecutors when they file 
criminal claims.49  Why then the kerfuffle when the SEC exercises a forum 
selection option by electing to bring an action in an administrative forum 
rather than in federal court? 
The answer to this question is, I think, central to the resolution of the 
current controversy.  Typically, when a plaintiff selects a forum, the fact-
finder is not in the plaintiff’s employ, the appeal is not to the plaintiff itself, 
and the plaintiff does not control the rules governing the proceeding.  The 
appearance of impropriety under these circumstances is clear, even if one 
believes that the administrative process is itself largely fair and efficient. 
Viewed from this perspective, the appropriate objective is not to end the 
Commission’s reliance on administrative proceedings, or even necessarily 
to reform those proceedings so that they more closely mimic federal district 
court trials.  Instead, the more appropriate objective may be to assure that 
 
 44. See infra Part II. 
 45. See supra note 11. 
 46. See supra note 11. 
 47. See Henning, supra note 9 (“The Dodd-Frank Act gave the S.E.C. the authority to 
choose the forum for almost any case, so if there is a culprit here it is Congress, not the 
agency.  It can be argued that the S.E.C. pushed too hard in bringing more cases before its 
in-house judges, but using the tools provided by Congress to its advantage should not have 
come as any great surprise.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Anthony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 
170 (2000) (observing that “venue statutes typically let the plaintiff choose among a number 
of courts” and “grant[] the plaintiff leeway to select a venue that he considers convenient to 
him, or—and the two are often corollaries—inconvenient to the defendant”). 
 49. See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping:  A Realistic Look at 
Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80 (1999) (“[A]ttorneys filing lawsuits or defending 
against lawsuits usually have the same objective when it comes to evaluating or seeking a 
venue—they seek a venue in which their clients can not only get a fair trial, but in which 
their clients might gain some advantage or begin with the odds in their favor.”); Joseph A. 
Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Provisions:  A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 342 (2013) 
(suggesting that plaintiffs select forums “to secure a tactical advantage”). 
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the mechanism for allocating enforcement matters between administrative 
and federal forums is fair and acts to provide the Commission with 
incentives to refresh its internal rules to reflect contemporary litigation 
realities.  Indeed, proposals that would dramatically cut back on the SEC’s 
ability to rely on administrative proceedings could result in a flood of 
potentially complex litigation to the federal courts, which already complain 
that they are overburdened.50  That result is not clearly in the public 
interest. 
So framed, the current debate over the Commission’s shift to 
administrative proceedings presents a problem of institutional design.51  If a 
trusted, independent third party, and not the Commission, decided whether 
any particular case was more fairly and efficiently resolved in an 
administrative proceeding rather than in federal court, then much of the 
consternation over the Commission’s administrative proceedings would be 
removed.  This independent third party’s decisions also could provide 
incentives for the ongoing modernization of the SEC’s internal procedures 
because the more credible the Commission’s claims of fairness and 
efficiency, the higher the probability that the independent third party would 
allow the Commission to retain jurisdiction over a larger number of 
proceedings. 
This Article proposes a removal statute that casts the federal judiciary in 
the role of a trusted, independent third party tasked with the responsibility 
of determining whether a Commission enforcement proceeding should 
proceed as an administrative action or in federal court.  To economize on 
the decision-making costs associated with the introduction of the federal 
courts as such a “traffic cop,” this Article proposes that Commission 
enforcement proceedings be divided into three categories.  The first 
category would include all cases statutorily required to be litigated in the 
administrative forum as well as all cases for which administrative 
proceedings are appropriate because of the nature of the question presented 
and the SEC’s specialized expertise.  For example, cases alleging violations 
of the Commission’s complex net capital rules, late filing of documents, 
and the failure to register with the SEC might rationally fall into this 
category.52 
 
 50. By making removal mandatory upon the request of certain respondents, the Due 
Process Restoration Act threatens to increase the congestion of federal court dockets by 
shifting a number of cases out of the administrative forum and into federal court.  For 
criticism of the bill, see supra note 23.  For an example of a discussion of the perpetual 
“‘crisis’ of ‘underfunded’ courts, crowded dockets and justice delayed,” see Stephen J. 
Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good?:  “Overcrowded Courts” and the Private Sector 
Alternative of Arbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899, 900–04 (2013). 
 51. For examples of discussions of mechanism design or institutional design as applied 
to federal securities regulation, see generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:  
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); David Freeman 
Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013); Zachary J. 
Gubler, Reconsidering the Institutional Design of Federal Securities Regulation, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 409 (2014). 
 52. For a more detailed discussion of this categorization, see infra Part IV. 
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At the other extreme, a second category would be composed of cases that 
must be heard in federal court and that may not be brought in administrative 
proceedings except with defendants’ consent.  Clearly, litigation calling for 
remedies unavailable in administrative proceedings (such as freeze orders, 
orders of contempt, or subpoena enforcement proceedings) would fall in 
this category and could not be heard in the administrative forum even with 
respondents’ consent.  Beyond these easy cases, the definition of this 
category is sure to be controversial, but, as a first cut, it might be reasonable 
to suggest that, in light of the Commission’s checkered insider trading 
litigation history, insider trading allegations be resolved in federal court 
unless the defendants consent to an administrative proceeding.  This 
category also could be expanded to include cases that seek significant 
monetary penalties or that satisfy other objective indicia of complexity. 
The third category would be composed of cases that fall in neither of 
these two categories.  In these residual cases, if the Commission decides to 
bring an administrative action, then the respondent would be permitted to 
petition a federal district court for removal at the court’s discretion.  This 
removal process would be modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(f),53 and the statute would articulate criteria and time deadlines 
governing the removal process.  In determining whether to grant a petition 
for removal, the court would assess the relative merits of administrative 
versus judicial resolution for the specific facts and legal questions presented 
by the case at issue.  The court also would balance the efficiency 
considerations associated with docket loads in the federal judiciary.  The 
greater the federal judiciary’s confidence in the ability of the Commission’s 
administrative process to resolve a dispute fairly and efficiently, the greater 
the probability that a court would allow the case to continue in the 
administrative forum. 
This statutory sorting mechanism would help assure that (1) cases that 
belong in the administrative process stay in the administrative process; (2) 
cases that belong in the federal courts remain in the federal courts; and (3) 
cases that could reasonably be resolved in either forum are allocated by a 
trusted, independent third party through a mechanism that also incentivizes 
the Commission to improve its internal procedures.  This approach differs 
significantly from other proposals that would, in a rather undifferentiated 
fashion, cause a large scale and de facto automatic shift of litigation from 
the administrative forum to federal court.54 
 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order 
granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to 
appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.  An appeal does 
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so 
orders.”). 
 54. Commentators have offered various proposals for allowing respondents to transfer 
cases out of the administrative forum and into federal court.  For a discussion of the Due 
Process Restoration Act and the Financial CHOICE Act and for criticism of those bills, see 
supra notes 21–24.  Christopher Cox, former Chairman of the SEC, has suggested that “a 
party who is not a regulated person or entity and who is charged in an administrative 
proceeding could safely be given the right to remove to federal court.” Chris Cox, Partner, 
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Part I of this Article details the historical operation of the Commission’s 
internal administrative procedures and summarizes the consternation over 
those procedures.  Part II describes the Commission’s recent response to 
these critiques, including amendments to its internal rules of procedure.  
Part III analyzes empirical data cited by both sides to the debate.  Finally, 
Part IV sets forth the rationale for a three-part removal statute as a 
mechanism for resolving this dispute, outlines the structure of the proposed 
statute, and describes the legal engineering required to operationalize the 
proposal. 
I.  CONSTERNATION OVER THE SEC’S 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
Critics have historically presented a long list of complaints about the 
fairness of the SEC’s internal procedures.  However, these complaints must 
be evaluated in the context of recently adopted amendments to the 
Commission’s Rules of Practice55 that were designed to respond to at least 
some of these critiques.  To better frame the debate about the structure and 
fairness of the Commission’s administrative proceedings, this part describes 
the rules governing the SEC’s administrative proceedings as those rules 
existed prior to the recent amendments.  Part II then describes the 
Commission’s newly amended rules and observes that the SEC’s critics 
remain unmollified by amendments they describe as “modest and 
incremental reforms” that “do little to address the most fundamental 
inequities of the SEC’s in-house courts and continue to leave respondents 
before an ALJ at a significant disadvantage.”56 
Historically, one of the more frequently voiced complaints against the 
SEC’s Rules of Practice was that proceedings were prosecuted on a rapid 
timetable57 that disadvantaged respondents by leaving them inadequate time 
 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, The Growing Use of SEC Administrative Proceedings:  An 
Historical Perspective from Congress and the Agency, Remarks at Securities Enforcement 
Forum West (May 13, 2015), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/05/2015-05-13-Speech-to-Securities-Enforcement-Forum-West-San-Francisco.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DVV4-7TJZ].  The Chamber of Commerce has also suggested that 
“persons and entities seeking a jury trial [should be permitted] to immediately have the case 
removed to a federal court, conditioned on timely filing of a notice of removal for a jury 
trial.” CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 20. 
 55. See generally Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Exchange Act 
Release No. 78319, 2016 WL 3853756 (July 13, 2016) [hereinafter SEC Final Rules]. 
 56. The SEC Retains Its House Advantage During Administrative Proceedings, 
CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP (Aug. 5, 2016) [hereinafter CADWALADER], 
http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/the-sec-retains-its-house-
advantage-during-administrative-proceedings [https://perma.cc/CG2J-C39W]. 
 57. Prior to the recent amendments, 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 stated that 
[i]nitial decisions must be filed within the number of days prescribed in the order 
instituting proceedings—120, 210, or 300 days from the date of service of the 
order instituting proceedings.  Broadly speaking, administrative proceedings 
instituted pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Exchange Act are designated as 120-day 
cases, administrative proceedings seeking sanctions as a result of an injunction or 
conviction are designated as 210-day cases, and administrative proceedings 
alleging violations of the securities laws were designated as 300-day cases. 
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to prepare a defense.58  Respondents also were severely limited in their 
ability to take depositions and to engage in other forms of exploratory 
discovery typically available in federal court.59  Instead, a respondent’s 
 
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091, 60,092 (proposed 
Oct. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).  It bears emphasis that the actual number 
of days available for a respondent to prepare for the hearing, once the order instituting 
proceedings was filed, was materially shorter than these time periods indicate because these 
time periods include the period during which the ALJ prepared and filed the decision in the 
case, as well as the time period during which the hearing itself was conducted.  A 120-day 
timeline anticipated approximately one month from the order instituting proceedings to the 
hearing, approximately two months for the parties to review the transcript and submit briefs, 
and approximately one month after briefing for the hearing officer to issue an initial 
decision. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (2016).  A 210-day timeline anticipated approximately 
two and one-half months from the order instituting proceedings to the hearing, 
approximately two months for the parties to review the transcript and submit briefs, and 
approximately two and one-half months after briefing for the hearing officer to issue an 
initial decision. Id.  A 300-day timeline anticipated approximately four months from the 
order instituting proceedings to the hearing, approximately two months for the parties to 
obtain the transcript and submit briefs, and approximately four months after briefing for the 
hearing officer to issue an initial decision. Id.  
 58. Critics contend that these deadlines were “unrealistic” and that they significantly 
curtailed “the ability of defense counsel to fully develop and present a robust defense in an 
administrative proceeding.” Alan M. Lieberman, Fast-Track Justice:  Is the SEC Exercising 
‘Unchecked and Unbalanced Power’?, WESTLAW J. SEC. LITIG. & REG., Sept. 18, 2014, at 1; 
see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 17 (“The lack of adequate 
discovery opportunities and sufficient time to prepare for trials are serious disadvantages that 
raise fundamental issues as to the efficacy of bringing complex litigation under the existing 
Rules of Practice.”); Ryan Jones, The Fight over Home Court:  An Analysis of the SEC’s 
Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 524 (2015) (“The SEC 
administrative courts’ unrealistic time constraints relating to decision issuances are perhaps 
the forum’s most prominent procedural disadvantage. . . .  Given all of these time pressures, 
administrative respondents are more likely to settle, even if they think that their case has 
merit.”).  This problem is likely to be exacerbated as increasingly complex insider trading 
and financial fraud cases are pursued in the administrative forum. See Jones, supra, at 524. 
 59. Prior to the recent amendments, 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 permitted depositions by oral 
examination only if a witness would be unable to attend or testify at a hearing. See 
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,102.  Commission 
rules governing administrative proceedings do not provide for interrogatories or requests for 
admission. See Lieberman, supra note 58, at 3.  Expert testimony was permitted only when 
allowed by the ALJ, and requests were routinely denied when the enforcement division 
objected. See Letter from Thomas V. Sjoblom to Senator Mark Kirk 2 (June 24, 2015) 
[hereinafter Sjoblom Letter] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).  Even when expert 
testimony was allowed, Commission rules provided for “minimal pretrial disclosure, d[id] 
not require an expert report and ha[d] no provision for expert depositions.” Lieberman, supra 
note 58, at 3.  The only real discovery tool available to respondents was the right to 
subpoena documents in advance of trial, and even that right was restricted to U.S. territorial 
boundaries. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.232.  In addition, respondents who wished to obtain 
documents had to apply to the ALJ for a subpoena and demonstrate that it was warranted, 
and the ALJ had discretion to refuse to issue subpoenas that were “unreasonable, oppressive, 
excessive in scope, or unduly burdensome.” Id.; see also Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes 
to Its Rules of Practice Are Woefully Inadequate—Part III, SEC. DIARY (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/18/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-rules-of-
practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-iii/ (“As a result of this highly restrictive set of rules 
governing subpoenas by respondents—compared to almost no restrictions for subpoenas 
issued by the SEC staff during the investigative process—very modest document discovery 
is possible in SEC administrative proceedings.”) [https://perma.cc/S42E-ZWVY].  By 
contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit broad discovery by all parties of “any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 
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principal source of evidence was the Commission’s own investigative file, 
which the SEC is required to make available to the respondent relatively 
early in the proceeding.60  Respondents also had very little time to review 
and digest the Commission’s investigative material—which could amount 
to hundreds of thousands of pages of evidence—whereas the Commission’s 
staff would often have had years to build a record that could be carefully 
fashioned to support the SEC’s theory of the case.61  Limiting discovery in 
 
needs of the case.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 
742 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have previously recognized that the scope of 
permissible discovery under Rule 26 is ‘broad.’”).  Rule 26 has traditionally been subject to 
four limitations:   
(1) privileged matter is not discoverable; (2) discovery of material obtained in 
preparation for trial, including expert testimony, is restricted; (3) a physical or 
mental examination can be ordered only for good cause and only if physical or 
mental condition is “in controversy”; and (4) as is indicated by the introductory 
language of Rule 26(b), the court may limit the scope of discovery in accordance 
with the rules.  
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2007 (3d ed. 1998). 
 60. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a).  
 61. Critics have lambasted the unfairness of permitting the Commission’s staff “to 
investigate matters for several years” and “to interview and take testimony from whomever 
they choose,” while allowing respondents to engage in very little exploratory discovery. 
Sjoblom Letter, supra note 59, at 2; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 
20, at 15 (“The lack of pre-hearing discovery adversely affects the respondent rather than the 
SEC staff.  This is because the staff has been able to compile its evidentiary record, 
including sworn depositions, through its investigation process.  In effect, the staff is able to 
conduct its pre-hearing discovery before beginning the proceeding.  The respondents in an 
administrative proceeding have no comparable opportunity.”); Eaglesham, supra note 12 
(“The move [to administrative proceedings] is creating a backlash among lawyers and 
defendants, who say in federal court they have more extensive rights to take witness 
testimony and collect evidence ahead of a trial.”); Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to Its 
Rules of Practice Are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, SEC. DIARY (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/05/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-rules-of-
practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-ii/ (“[T]he current discovery provisions for 
administrative proceedings in the SEC’s Rules of Practice are designed to handcuff defense 
counsel and prevent a fair opportunity to develop a reasonable defense.”) 
[https://perma.cc/AN76-SX85]; Steven E. Hudson, Partner, Kilpatrick Townsend, Comment 
Letter on Proposed Rule:  Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice (Dec. 3, 
2015) [hereinafter Hudson Comment Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-
15/s71815-5.pdf (“[T]he Enforcement Division enjoys seemingly limitless time to 
investigate and prepare a case against respondents, while respondents receive very little time 
to prepare a defense.”) [https://perma.cc/3M6R-467H]; Tom Quaadman, Senior Vice 
President, Ctr. for Capital Mkt. Competitiveness, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule:  
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice 4 (Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Quaadman 
Comment Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-12.pdf (“[T]he lack of 
adequate pretrial discovery in administrative proceedings is a glaring inadequacy of the 
current process.”) [https://perma.cc/555Q-JFXV].  As one commentator noted: 
The Commission’s position is one-sided. It fails to recognize the substantial 
disadvantage respondents face in relying only on the product of an extensive ex 
parte investigation by the staff.  The Commission’s refusal to make, at a minimum, 
deposition discovery discretionary with the ALJ when good cause is shown 
precludes respondents from obtaining evidence from persons who did not provide 
testimony in the investigation. Moreover, without deposition discovery from 
witnesses who testified in the investigation, respondents cannot explore the 
testimony taken by the staff to obtain additional evidence and to test the credibility 
of witnesses in advance of hearing. 
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large part to the independent investigation of the Commission’s staff also 
raised the concern that this staff, particularly toward the end of its 
investigation, “may have lost some objectivity and may be more concerned 
with proving its case against particular respondents than with uncovering 
details that might reveal deficiencies in its position.”62 
In some situations, however, respondents can “shadow” the 
Commission’s investigation by interviewing the same parties that were 
questioned by the Commission and by attempting to gather the same 
documents collected by the SEC.63  These efforts will not always succeed:  
witnesses who cooperated with the Commission may refuse to speak with 
respondent counsel, and documents produced to the Commission by third 
parties may not be voluntarily produced.64  The Commission’s investigation 
and timing advantages can therefore persist even when the SEC confronts 
the most diligent and resourceful opposing counsel. 
Also, when comparing federal civil litigation with the Commission’s 
administrative proceedings, it warrants mention that the Commission, in 
administrative proceedings, is required to produce a broad category of 
documents pursuant to the Brady rule65 and to the Jencks Act66 but that no 
such production is required in a civil proceeding filed by the Commission.67  
 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL:  TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 372 (2d ed. 2007). 
 62. KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, supra note 61, at 373; see 
also Andrew N. Vollmer, Four Ways to Improve SEC Enforcement, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 333, 
337–38 (2015) (“The staff is committed to ‘winning,’ which means having the Commission 
authorize a proceeding, and that will-to-win warps the fact-gathering process.  The staff 
looks so hard for something that seems wrong or that can be portrayed as wrong that they 
lose perspective and objectivity.”).  The result is that counsel for respondents often cannot 
adequately discover facts in advance of a hearing. See KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON 
GATES ELLIS LLP, supra note 61, at 373. 
 63. See Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 (“[I]n many cases respondents 
know full well what the important evidence is, either because they produced it to us 
themselves, because it was testimony from their own employees or someone else to whom 
they have access before the hearing, or because we have shared it with them in testimony or 
in the course of Wells discussions.  So the bottom line is that there are extensive procedural 
protections in our proceedings and defendants have transparency into the nature of our case 
and proof well before the hearing commences.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Hudson Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 3 (noting that “[p]otential 
witnesses fear drawing the Enforcement Division’s ire and thus avoid any contact with 
respondents that might lead to those witnesses being called opposite the Division at the final 
hearing”). 
 65. The Brady rule, named for Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires 
prosecutors to disclose to the defense any exculpatory evidence material to guilt or 
punishment that is in the government’s possession. 
 66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).  The Jencks Act requires the government, upon motion 
of the defendant and only after a witness has testified on direct examination, to produce “any 
statement . . . of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the 
subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” Id. § 3500(b). 
 67. See, e.g., SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *16 n.44 (“Under Rule 230, which 
incorporates certain criminal process rights derived from criminal cases and statutes, 
respondents receive documents that contain material exculpatory evidence under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  No analogous provision is present in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.”); Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 (noting that in 
administrative proceedings the SEC “ha[s] affirmative Brady obligations to disclose 
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By contrast, the SEC’s Rules of Practice require the production of only 
certain categories of documents, such as subpoenas and transcripts, and 
production is required only by order of the Commission or the hearing 
officer.68  Accordingly, the SEC’s “watered-down quasi-Brady obligation” 
falls short of the full, compulsory production of exculpatory evidence 
envisioned by the Brady rule.69  Brady rule and Jencks Act obligations 
in the administrative setting may therefore not level the playing field as 
much as the Commission suggests. 
Further, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in administrative 
proceedings.70  Critics complain that the more liberal standard traditionally 
applied in Commission administrative proceedings allows the Commission 
to introduce hearsay and other forms of evidence that are impermissible in 
federal court.71  The admission of hearsay evidence “effectively undercut[s] 
the ability of a [respondent] to challenge the offered evidence through 
cross-examination, traditionally considered as an essential trial right to 
discovering the truth.”72  Critics also assert that “the looser evidentiary 
standards in administrative proceedings compound the problem presented 
by the number of cases the SEC brings based on purely circumstantial 
evidence, sometimes without a single witness who can relate firsthand 
knowledge of any wrongdoing by the respondent.”73  The net result is a 
system that “reward[s] trial by ambush and result[s] in a distorted record.”74 
Critics further point out that juries are available in federal court75 but not 
in administrative proceedings.76  Federal court judges are nominated by the 
 
material, exculpatory information and Jencks Act obligations to turn over statements of our 
witnesses—neither of which apply in our district court proceedings”). 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a) (2016). 
 69. See, e.g., Stephen A. Best et al., Imposing Brady-Like Obligations on the SEC?, 
INSIGHTS, June 2014, at 15, 15 (“Because the rule imposes no affirmative duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence as such, the SEC need not disclose all exculpatory information in its 
possession, as the Brady decision requires.”). 
 70. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (governing the standard for admissibility of evidence in the 
Commission’s administrative proceedings).  Prior to the recent amendments, the rule 
permitted the Commission or hearing officer to “receive relevant evidence and [to] exclude 
all evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.” Amendments to the 
Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091, 60,095 (proposed Oct. 5, 2015) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).  
 71. See Peter J. Henning, A Small Step in Changing S.E.C. Administrative Proceedings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/business/dealbook/a-
small-step-in-changing-sec-administrative-proceedings.html (“One amendment would 
expressly permit the use of hearsay evidence in the proceeding as long as it ‘bears 
satisfactory indicia of reliability so that its use is fair.’  That is not the standard for admitting 
evidence in federal court actions in which the rules of evidence bar the use of hearsay unless 
it comes within a clearly prescribed exception.”) [https://perma.cc/75RJ-2C8R]. 
 72. Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 11. 
 73. William F. Johnson & Amelia R. Medina, SEC’s Administrative Enforcement 
Intensifies Fairness Debate, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2014, at 5. 
 74. Lieberman, supra note 58, at 3. 
 75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) (“The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution . . . is preserved to the parties inviolate.”). 
 76. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 
442, 455–61 (1977) (holding that Congress could assign the adjudication of new public 
rights to an administrative SEC with which a jury trial would be incompatible without 
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President and confirmed by the Senate, whereas ALJs are hired by the 
Commission.77  The practice of having SEC employees hear and resolve 
claims that are filed and prosecuted by the SEC creates the appearance of 
bias and lack of objectivity.78  At least one former ALJ has made statements 
 
violating the Seventh Amendment’s injunction that jury trials are to be “preserved” in “suits 
at common law”); Mohawk Excavating, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 549 F.2d 859, 865 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding “the seventh amendment is no bar to the 
imposition of civil penalties through the administrative process without jury trial in the 
enforcement of this Act”); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015) 
(holding that, in an action challenging the constitutionality of SEC administrative 
proceedings, the “[p]laintiff cannot prove a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of 
his Seventh Amendment claim as this claim involves a public right, and Congress has the 
right to send public rights cases to administrative proceedings”).  Critics bemoan the 
Commission’s unilateral abrogation of an otherwise “inviolate” jury trial right in SEC 
administrative proceedings, particularly in cases where monetary penalties are sought. See, 
e.g., Cox, supra note 54, at 6 (“Depriving a litigant of a jury trial is undoubtedly efficient, 
but it may not seem desirable to an individual who feels wrongly accused.”); Lieberman, 
supra note 58, at 3 (“In SEC enforcement actions, this ‘inviolate’ [Seventh Amendment] 
right can be unilaterally taken from a defendant by the Enforcement Division’s decision to 
file its action as an administrative proceeding.”); Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor 
and Judge, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014, 7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-
ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-1407195362 (“Administrative hearings also do not 
have juries, even when severe financial penalties and forfeitures are demanded. . . .  In short, 
while administrative prosecutions create the illusion of a fair trial, and while administrative 
law judges generally strive to appear impartial, these proceedings afford defendants woefully 
inadequate due process.”) [https://perma.cc/M439-TQ44]; Suji A. Thomas & Mark Cuban, A 
Jury, Not the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/10/17/business/dealbook/a-jury-not-the-sec.html?_r=0 (“[A] defendant accused of 
wrongdoing by the government and facing significant monetary penalties should have the 
option of a jury deciding his case.”) [https://perma.cc/U4PC-WD46]. 
 77. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 54, at 7 (“However independent they may strive to be, the 
ALJs are employed by the SEC, draw their paychecks from the SEC, work at SEC 
Headquarters, and have friends among the enforcement staff.”); see also KIRKPATRICK & 
LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, supra note 61, at 329. 
 78. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL. ST. J. (May 6, 
2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 
(“‘The SEC appoints the judges, the SEC pays the judges, they are subject to appeal to the 
SEC,’ U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff said.  ‘That can create an appearance issue, even if the 
judges are excellent, as I have every reason to believe they are.’”) [https://perma.cc/GE6E-
8K6E]; Morgenson, supra note 12 (“But some legal experts say these proceedings suffer 
from potential bias because the judges operate within the agency bringing them.  The 
possibility of a home-court advantage or a sympathetic adjudicator, critics say, raises 
questions of fairness, especially for individuals defending themselves in these matters.”).   
  Mark Cuban, the billionaire owner of the NBA’s Dallas Mavericks, who was 
acquitted by a federal jury of charges that he committed insider trading, recently filed an 
amicus brief in support of insider trading defendant, Charles Hill. See Motion of Mark 
Cuban for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Charles L. 
Hill, Jr. and Affirmance, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-12831).  
Calling himself a “first-hand witness to and victim of SEC overreach,” Cuban’s motion 
opposes the SEC’s appeal of Judge Leigh Martin May’s decision preliminarily enjoining the 
SEC’s administrative action against Hill. Id. at 1.  In the motion, Cuban criticized the 
Commission’s administrative proceedings as “inherently biased,” id. at 6, and “lack[ing] the 
procedural tools required to reach a fair and accurate result,” id. at 13.  Cuban also attributed 
his own victory over insider trading charges to “the procedural rules available to him [in 
federal court], the independence of the judge enforcing those rules, and the independent fact-
finding by the jury,” pointing out that these protections would not have been available had 
his enforcement action been filed in an administrative forum. Id. at 5.  Cuban subsequently 
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consistent with the existence of bias,79 but a subsequent investigation by the 
SEC’s Office of Inspector General found no “evidence to support the 
allegations of improper influence.”80 
Critics also complain that the first-level appeal from the ALJ’s decision 
is not to a federal court, but to the very same Commission that authorized 
the proceeding in the initial instance.81  The five Commissioners are thus in 
the position of acting both as prosecutors and as judges:  prosecutors when 
authorizing the complaint and judges when ruling on the appeal from the 
ALJ decision resolving the complaint they initially authorized.  While 
respondents have the right to appeal any Commission ruling to a federal 
court of appeals,82 this second-level review is also criticized as flawed, 
most notably because Commission orders are afforded substantially more 
deference on appeal than are the rulings of federal district court judges.83  
 
made additional filings in separate actions that have similarly challenged the 
constitutionality of the SEC’s administrative proceedings. See Brief for Mark Cuban as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 
WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016); see also infra note 92. 
 79. Eaglesham, supra note 78 (quoting former ALJ Lillian McEwen, who “said she 
thought the system was slanted against defendants at times” and suggested that she “came 
under fire from [the SEC’s chief ALJ] for finding too often in favor of defendants”). 
 80. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:  CASE NO. 15-ALJ-
0482-I, at 1 (2016).  This report also noted that “[f]ormer and current staff affiliated with the 
Office of ALJs . . . stated that ALJ decisions were made independently and free from 
influence of SEC Chief ALJ [Brenda] Murray.” Id. 
 81. See Eaglesham, supra note 78 (revealing that from January 2010 through March 
2015, the Commission decided in favor of the SEC 95 percent of the time in appeals from 
ALJ decisions); see also Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Indeed, 
if anything, it would be inherently difficult for the Commission, which will have to approve 
any final order against Gupta, to be deciding whether it itself engaged in unequal protection 
in bringing its charges against Gupta.”); Luke T. Cadigan, Litigating an SEC Administrative 
Proceeding, BOS. B.J. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/01/07/litigating-an-
sec-administrative-proceeding/ (“But because the SEC initially determined that there was a 
sufficient basis for bringing the action, a respondent has a difficult task in convincing the 
SEC upon appeal that there is no basis for liability.”) [https://perma.cc/786L-MWM9]; Cox, 
supra note 54, at 7 (“Litigants who choose to appeal an adverse judgment in an 
[administrative proceeding] therefore get a very different experience than they would find in 
federal court.  At a minimum, it appears to them and to the outside world that the process is 
much less fair.”). 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012) (“A person aggrieved by a final order of the 
Commission entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review of the order in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of 
business.”); id. § 77i(a) (“Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission may obtain a 
review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States, within any circuit wherein 
such person resides or has his principal place of business, or in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia . . . .”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(e) (2016) 
(“[P]etition to the Commission for review of an initial decision is a prerequisite to the 
seeking of judicial review of a final order entered pursuant to such decision.”). 
 83. An appellate court reviews factual determinations made by the Commission under 
the highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard rather than the “clearly erroneous” 
standard applied to decisions made by lower court judges. See United States v. Abad, 350 
F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying the clearly erroneous standard). Compare 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78y(a)(4) (“The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial 
evidence, are conclusive.”), and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (“The reviewing court shall . . . (2) 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (E) 
unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or 
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Thus, federal courts of appeals “tend to go along with the SEC unless 
there’s an egregious error,”84 but they apply tighter scrutiny of federal 
district court rulings. 
Critics also dispute the efficiency of administrative proceedings, which 
the SEC frequently touts as one of the procedural advantages of proceeding 
in-house.85  While the path from the order instituting proceedings to the 
ALJ’s initial decision can indeed be rapid, the initial decision is not a final 
judgment and does not become final until the Commission issues an opinion 
on appeal or, if no party appeals the initial decision to the Commission, a 
notice of finality.86  Therefore, the true length of an administrative 
 
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute . . . .”), with FED. 
R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial 
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”).  The “substantial evidence” test 
“has always involved a large amount of deference to the relevant fact-finder” and “is a more 
deferential standard than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard that [circuit courts] use for 
reviewing factual determinations by lower court judges.” Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 
F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999) 
(“Traditionally, this court/court standard of review has been considered somewhat stricter 
(i.e., allowing somewhat closer judicial review) than the APA’s court/agency standards.”).  
An appellate court often applies Chevron deference to the Commission’s legal conclusions, 
although it reviews de novo the legal findings of a district court judge. See Cox, supra note 
54, at 7; see also Tyler L. Spunaugle, The SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative 
Proceedings:  Increased Efficiency or Unconstitutional Expansion of Agency Power?, 34 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 406, 410–11 (2015).  In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that agency regulations 
“are given controlling weight” if Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of 
the statute by regulation, and unless the regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute. Id. at 843–44.  However, in a critique of the Commission’s recent 
Flannery ruling, Professor Andrew Vollmer suggests several reasons why a reviewing court 
need not, and in many cases should not, grant Chevron deference to legal interpretations in 
an SEC adjudication. See generally Vollmer, supra note 20.  Vollmer points to the statutory 
text of the Administrative Procedure Act, which commands that “the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law,” and which “admit[s] no deference on legal questions.” 
Id. at 326–27.  Vollmer further observes that the Supreme Court has “not always accepted 
agency legal conclusions of ambiguous statutes as binding” and that “the actual practice of 
most courts of appeals is not to defer to the SEC on questions of law in an adjudication.” Id. 
at 327–29.  Principles of stare decisis also require courts to follow judicial precedent, 
especially when “an agency interpretation varies from the way the courts, especially the 
Supreme Court, has been interpreting and applying the same legal provision.” Id. at 331.  
Finally, Vollmer observes that significant questions have been raised “about the obligation 
of a reviewing court to give controlling weight to the SEC’s legal interpretations of Section 
17(a) and Rule 10b-5” and other laws “that contemplate[] both criminal and administrative 
enforcement.” Id. at 333. 
 84. Eaglesham, supra note 78 (quoting Thomas Gorman, a former SEC attorney now at 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP). 
 85. See, e.g., Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 (“[A]dministrative actions 
produce prompt decisions.”). 
 86. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(e) (“[P]etition to the Commission for review of an initial 
decision is a prerequisite to the seeking of judicial review of a final order entered pursuant to 
such decision.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); id. § 77i(a); Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 
No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) (“The Commission’s final 
action is either in the form of a new decision after de novo review or, by declining to grant or 
order review, its embrace of the ALJ’s initial decision as its own.  In either event, the 
Commission has retained full decision-making powers, and the mere passage of time is not 
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proceeding must take into account the time required for the Commission to 
review the initial decision and render a final judgment, which can be quite 
time consuming.  In contrast to ALJs, who operate under strict time 
constraints, the Commission is under no mandatory deadline when ruling on 
appeals from ALJ decisions,87 and its own discretionary guidelines are 
rarely followed in practice.88  Indeed, data suggest that after factoring in 
delays associated with Commission review, “the overall period for 
completion of an administrative proceeding is likely slower than the time 
required to complete a trial in district court.”89  “[T]he SEC’s approach 
 
enough to establish finality.  And even when there is not full review by the Commission, it is 
the act of issuing the finality order that makes the initial decision the action of the 
Commission . . . .”). 
 87. When an initial decision is appealed to the Commission, the Rules of Practice dictate 
that a final order “should” be issued within seven months from the date the petition for 
review is filed. 17 C.F.R. § 201.900(a)(1)(iii).  The Commission can extend the deadline to 
eleven months from filing of the petition for review if it determines that the matter “presents 
unusual complicating circumstances.” Id.  The SEC retains discretion to further extend the 
deadline if it “determines that extraordinary facts and circumstances of the matter so 
require.” Id.  However, these deadlines are merely aspirational and are, in practice, often 
violated. See infra note 88. 
 88. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 (stating that between 
October 1, 2013, and March 31, 2015, only two of fifteen Commission opinions were issued 
within the guidelines period); see also Christian J. Mixter, The SEC’s Administrative Law 
Enforcement Record, 49 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 69, 74–75 (2016) (noting that the 
Commission failed to meet its seven-month guideline in seventeen of the last twenty 
reporting periods and failed to meet the eleven-month guideline in ten of the last twenty 
reporting periods).  The median disposition time for the issued opinions extended from 399 
days to 600 days. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.  This is in 
addition to the time required for the ALJ to conduct a hearing and issue an initial decision.  
Accordingly, the total time required to move an administrative proceeding from initiation to 
Commission decision is actually much longer than the Commission concedes and will likely 
get even longer if the SEC’s proposed revisions to the administrative process are 
implemented. See, e.g., Mixter, supra, at 75 (noting that for seven decisions, the average 
length from the order instituting proceedings to the Commission decision was two and a half 
years, and that “the Commission’s recent proposal to amend its [administrative proceeding] 
rules augurs a review process that will move yet more slowly in the future”); Jean 
Eaglesham, SEC Appeals Process on the Slow Track, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2015, 7:12 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-appeals-process-on-the-slow-track-1450743130 (“Since 
Mary Jo White became SEC chairman in April 2013, the median time for the agency to 
decide appeals of its in-house judges’ decisions has increased to 19 months.”) 
[https://perma.cc/77A9-DU74]; Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 14 
(“[R]elaxation of its internal guidelines seems inconsistent with the Commission’s stated 
purpose of improving the efficiency of the process and utilizing administrative proceedings 
because they are speedier.”).  The case against Flannery and Hopkins is illustrative. See 
Flannery, Release No. 438, 102 SEC Docket 1392 (Oct. 28, 2011), rev’d, Flannery, 
Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73840, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 3981, Investment Company Act Release No. 31374, 2014 WL 7145625, at 
*15–18 (Dec. 15, 2014), rev’d, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).  There, two 
employees of State Street Bank and Trust Company were charged with securities law 
violations in an administrative action. See id. at 1393.  After proceeding through a fast-paced 
300-day administrative hearing, respondents waited for more than three years for the SEC 
Commissioners to decide their appeal. See Eaglesham, supra (“After five years, four judges, 
three rulings, two appeals and the loss of their careers, John Flannery and James Hopkins 
this month won their legal battle against the Securities and Exchange Commission.”). 
 89. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 (emphasis added).  To be 
sure, district court cases can also languish for years.  As of September 30, 2014, 11 percent 
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means defendants often lose both ways.  The trial portion of the civil case 
moves much more quickly than such matters typically would in federal 
court, giving limited time to prepare for trial, and defendants then can wait 
years for the SEC to decide appeals.”90  In the interim, reputations and 
careers can be ruined, regardless of the ultimate result.91 
Taken together, opponents of the Commission’s regime complain that the 
path to circuit court review is long and expensive and that it involves such a 
high probability of having to operate under the shadow of an adverse 
finding that the prospect of meaningful review is more theoretical than real 
for many respondents.  They explain that the 
SEC is well aware that most litigants do not have the resources or ability 
to defend a principle and would be forced to capitulate rather than endure 
the years of litigation and the extreme resource drain necessary to obtain a 
fair federal court review of an administrative proceeding. . . .  In other 
words, the SEC is aware that experienced defense counsel perceive the 
SEC’s in-house proceedings to be less fair, and the SEC uses this fact to 
reduce the number of its cases that are tested in the crucible of federal 
court, even if only on appeal.92 
Separate and apart from these complaints about the fairness of the SEC’s 
proceedings as applied to any specific set of facts, concern persists that the 
Commission’s push to administrative proceedings is designed to help the 
Commission substitute its interpretation of the federal securities laws for 
the views expressed by the federal judiciary.93  Indeed, in a recent 
 
of cases on the district court dockets had been pending for three or more years. See U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014 tbl. C-6 (2014). 
 90. Eaglesham, supra note 88. 
 91. See, e.g., id. (noting that Flannery and Hopkins’s “rare victory has come at a price,” 
including several years of litigation and the loss of their careers). 
 92. Brief for Mark Cuban as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2–3, Bebo v. SEC, 
136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016) (No. 15-997) [hereinafter Bebo Amicus Brief]. 
 93. The Commission has made clear that its choice of an administrative forum in 
particular cases is specifically intended to influence the development of the law. See SEC, 
supra note 1.  In guidance on forum selection in contested actions issued on May 8, 2015, 
the Commission stated that 
[i]f a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex legal issues under 
the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the Commission’s rules, 
consideration should be given to whether, in light of the Commission’s expertise 
concerning those matters, obtaining a Commission decision on such issues, subject 
to appellate review in the federal courts, may facilitate development of the law. 
Id.; see also William F. Johnson, Is It Time to Reconsider ‘Chevron’ Deference for SEC 
Proceedings?, N.Y. L.J. (July 2, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
id=1202730989126/Is-It-Time-to-Reconsider-Chevron-Deference-for-SEC-Proceedings? 
mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL (noting that the Commission is “increasingly turning 
toward administrative proceedings with the express intent to develop the law”) 
[https://perma.cc/TVX3-2LX4]; Ceresney, Keynote Speech, supra note 2 (“If a contested 
matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex legal issues under the federal securities laws, 
or interpretation of the Commission’s rules, it may make sense to file the case as an 
administrative proceeding so a Commission decision on the issue, subject to appellate review 
in the federal courts, may facilitate development of the law.”).  Critics contend that 
administrative interpretation of the securities laws—a task historically borne by federal 
courts—“would not be good for the impartial development of the law in an area of immense 
practical importance,” and is “unlikely . . . to lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial 
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administrative proceeding, the SEC made this objective explicit.94  Even 
though the Commission’s decision in that matter was reversed and 
vacated,95 this public policy bell cannot be unrung. 
Historically, complex federal securities laws have often been developed 
and elucidated by federal court judges,96 and there are many situations in 
which the Commission’s interpretation of the federal securities laws 
conflicts with decisions reached by federal courts.97  Because the 
 
interpretations as would result from having those cases brought in federal court.” Rakoff, 
supra note 20, at 11; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 18 
(suggesting that “[t]he Commission should resist utilizing its administrative forum for [the 
purpose of superseding a judicial opinion with which it disagrees] in the absence of 
compelling circumstances making such an effort an appropriate use of its Dodd-Frank-
granted choice-of-forum capabilities”); Vollmer, supra note 20, at 278 (“The cumulative 
effect of an agency’s decision to roll back Supreme Court precedent and to consolidate for 
itself ultimate decision-making power over questions of law traditionally left to the courts 
would seriously alter the balance of responsibility between agencies and courts long 
recognized in our system of government.”). 
 94. See Flannery, Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73840, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3981, Investment Company Act Release No. 31374, 
2014 WL 7145625, at *9–10 (Dec. 15, 2014), rev’d, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2015).  Citing the SEC’s “experience and expertise in administering the securities laws,” the 
Commission opinion set out its own legal interpretation to resolve what it termed 
“confusion” and “inconsistencies” among the federal district courts concerning the scope of 
primary liability for fraud under the federal securities laws. Id.  Critics labeled this opinion 
“a questionable act of policy-making . . . with no public input” and an attempt “to preempt 
judicial development of the scope of several aspects of the securities laws by interceding and 
applying ‘agency expertise’ to interpret those laws and regulations extremely broadly.” SEC 
Majority Argues for Negating Janus Decision with Broad Interpretation of Rule 10b-5, SEC. 
DIARY (Dec. 19, 2014), https://securitiesdiary.com/2014/12/19/sec-majority-argues-for-
negating-janus-decision-with-broad-interpretation-of-rule-10b-5/ [https://perma.cc/2S6U-
9AV7]; see also Vollmer, supra note 20, at 277 (“A reading of the Flannery decision leaves 
the definite impression that a majority of SEC Commissioners aimed to use the case as a 
vehicle to recover much of the territory lost in the enforcement area from the Supreme Court 
decisions and the lower federal courts that have been following the Supreme Court’s lead.”); 
Susan D. Resley et al., Dealing with the SEC’s Administrative Proceeding Trend, LAW360 
(Jan. 13, 2015, 5:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/610688/dealing-with-the-sec-s-
administrative-proceeding-trend (suggesting that the Flannery ruling illustrated the 
Commission’s “intent to use the administrative forum as a vehicle to interpret the securities 
laws and regulations aggressively and to attempt administratively to overrule lower court 
precedent that the SEC does not like”) [https://perma.cc/9XUS-YHLY]. 
 95. See Flannery, 810 F.3d at 9 (vacating the Commission’s order and noting that 
“where the [Commission] has reached a conclusion opposite of that of the ALJ, our review is 
slightly less deferential than it would be otherwise” (quoting Haas Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 299 
F.3d 23, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2002))); see also Timothy P. Burke et al., First Circuit Overturns 
SEC Ruling in Flannery v. SEC, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/first-circuit-overturns-sec-ruling-in-flannery-v-sec 
(“The First Circuit’s decision underscores the limits of court deference to Commission 
decisions . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/87DQ-F28K]; First Circuit Rebuffs SEC in Flannery and 
Hopkins Case and Vacates SEC Order, SEC. DIARY (Dec. 9, 2015), http:// 
securitiesdiary.com/tag/in-re-flannery-and-hopkins/ (“The First Circuit panel found, 
however, that the underlying evidence simply failed to support the finding of any violation 
on any theory, even the aggressive interpretations set forth by the Commission in its 
opinion.”) [https://perma.cc/T6JJ-E6Z3]. 
 96. See Rakoff, supra note 20, at 8. 
 97. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655–59 (1983) (rejecting the SEC’s theory 
that a recipient of confidential information (i.e., the “tippee”) must refrain from trading 
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Commission expects that its interpretation of the federal securities laws 
will, under the doctrine of Chevron deference, take precedence over 
conflicting interpretations by the federal courts,98 the Commission’s push to 
the administrative forum could override decades of well-established judicial 
precedent fashioned by the federal judiciary and replace it with conflicting 
Commission interpretations that more aggressively support the SEC’s 
enforcement agenda. 
Litigation is also afoot challenging the constitutionality of the process by 
which ALJs are appointed and can be removed.99  The resolution of this 
 
“whenever he receives inside information from an insider”); Flannery, 810 F.3d at 4 
(holding that the Commission’s findings of securities law violations lacked substantial 
evidence and vacating the Commission’s order); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 
448–49 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (“[W]e find no support for the 
Government’s contention that knowledge of a breach of the duty of confidentiality without 
knowledge of the personal benefit is sufficient to impose criminal liability.  Although the 
Government might like the law to be different, nothing in the law requires a symmetry of 
information in the nation’s securities markets.”); Vollmer, supra note 20, at 275 (explaining 
“that much about [the SEC’s decision in Flannery] is not consistent with, and is antagonistic 
to, a series of prominent Supreme Court decisions that imposed meaningful boundaries 
around aspects of primary liability under Rule 10b-5”); U.S. Supreme Court Limits Securities 
Fraud Liability to Parties with “Ultimate Authority” over Misstatements, PAUL WEISS 
RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (June 15, 2011), https://www.paulweiss.com/ 
media/102462/15Jun11SCOTUS.pdf (noting that the “ultimate authority” test adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 
(2011), for identifying the maker of a statement “is considerably narrower than the test 
proposed by the SEC”) [https://perma.cc/P2LG-TAU8]. 
 98. See Rakoff, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that “an S.E.C. administrative judge’s 
formal ruling on an otherwise undecided issue of statutory interpretation of the securities law 
is, just like rules enacted by the Commission, entitled to ‘Chevron’ deference”); Vollmer, 
supra note 20, at 275 (noting that in Flannery, “[t]he Commission not only advanced 
expansive legal conclusions, but it also insisted that the courts accept the agency’s legal 
interpretations as controlling”).  Critics have questioned whether Chevron deference remains 
appropriate in light of the Commission’s increased reliance on its own administrative 
proceedings to resolve complex questions of federal securities law. See, e.g., Johnson, supra 
note 93 (“[T]he Chevron decision did not appear to foresee nor pre-authorize the ability of 
the agency to foster a ‘home field’ litigation advantage to ‘develop the law,’ particularly in 
procedural circumstances where it appears the agency has an unfair advantage over 
respondents compared to federal district court.”); see also Vollmer, supra note 62, at 8 (“It is 
one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an agency’s interpretations 
once the agency announces them; it is quite another to require regulated parties to divine the 
agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held liable when the agency announces its 
interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference.” 
(quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012))).  Indeed, 
in Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), Judge Lewis Kaplan notes that “it is 
not at all clear that the Second Circuit definitively has taken the position that Commission 
interpretations in adjudicatory proceedings are entitled to Chevron [deference] . . . .  And 
regardless of what position the Second Circuit takes with respect to Chevron deference, the 
ultimate determiner of the issue will be the Supreme Court.” Id. at 436 n.157. 
 99. Although respondents have raised a panoply of constitutional challenges to 
administrative proceedings, the primary—and most successful—arguments to date have been 
predicated on Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  Article II challenges have assumed two 
forms.  First, respondents contend that “the SEC’s ALJs are ‘inferior officers’ who must be 
appointed by the head of an executive department.” E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. 
Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings:  An Empirical Assessment 13 
(Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 119, 2016) http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1233&context=law_econ_current [https://perma.cc/Q43C-7WVA].  
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constitutional dispute, significant as it is, will not affect the debate about the 
fairness of the SEC’s administrative procedures, because the constitutional 
controversy implicates the process by which ALJs are nominated and not 
the rules of procedure under which they operate.  The concerns over the 
fairness of SEC administrative proceedings that animate proposals for 
reform will therefore survive any resolution of the constitutional 
controversy, as long as administrative actions continue in their current 
form. 
II.  THE COMMISSION’S RESPONSE 
The Commission is well aware of these criticisms, and has responded 
with two distinct strategies. 
First, the Commission’s Division of Enforcement has issued a statement 
identifying four factors that it considers when deciding whether to proceed 
through the administrative forum or in federal court:  (1) “the availability of 
the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum”; (2) 
“whether any charged party is a registered entity or an individual associated 
with a registered entity”; (3) “the cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness of 
litigation in each forum”; and (4) “the fair, consistent, and effective 
resolution of securities law issues and matters.”100  Critics have 
characterized the factors as “nonexhaustive, nonmandatory and 
unweighted,” and as not placing any meaningful limit on the Commission’s 
exercise of discretion.101  Critics also contend that “any consideration of 
 
Second, respondents contend that “the SEC’s ALJs are unconstitutional because they are 
insulated from oversight by the President by more than one layer of ‘for cause’ removal.” Id.  
On August 9, 2016, the District of Columbia Circuit became the first appellate court to 
substantively address the constitutionality of the SEC’s nomination of ALJs. See Raymond J. 
Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016).  In Lucia, the 
court held that the SEC’s use of ALJs is constitutional because ALJs are employees who 
lack the authority to issue “final decisions,” rather than “[o]fficers” who must be appointed 
pursuant to the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at *5–7.  With at 
least one similar case pending before the Tenth Circuit, see Bandimere, Securities Act 
Release No. 9972, Exchange Act Release No. 76308, 2015 WL 6575665, at *19 (Oct. 29, 
2015), petition for review filed, No. 15-9586 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2015), the Lucia decision 
could set an important precedent in the constitutional debate, or it could lead to a circuit split 
that would have to be resolved by the Supreme Court.  The decision also could bolster the 
SEC’s reliance on its in-house tribunals, even in the face of increased attacks on the fairness 
of the administrative forum.  For a discussion of some of the recent litigation and the 
constitutional challenges raised therein, see Platt, supra note 1 (discussing the constitutional 
challenges to administrative proceedings), and see also Thomas S. Glassman, Ice Skating Up 
Hill:  Constitutional Challenges to SEC Administrative Proceedings, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 47 
(2015), and Zaring, supra note 9. 
 100. SEC, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
 101. See, e.g., Thomas A. Hanusik et al., What’s Missing from the SEC’s Forum Selection 
Guidance, LAW360 (May 21, 2015, 10:34 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
658532/what-s-missing-from-the-sec-s-forum-selection-guidance (suggesting that the 
guidance “missed a golden opportunity to make the forum selection process fairer to 
defendants”) [https://perma.cc/7DKG-4TBV]; SEC Enforcement Division Issues Guidance 
on Venue Selection, LATHAM & WATKINS (May 18, 2015), https://www.lw.com/ 
thoughtLeadership/lw-sec-guidance-choice-of-venue (observing that the guidance “basically 
affirms the SEC’s view of the venue-selection process as subject to rather broad discretion 
without meaningful limitations”) [https://perma.cc/M6L9-DRUL]. 
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defendants’ rights, beyond their impact on the SEC’s costs, is glaringly 
absent” from the guidance.102  Indeed, the Commission could, as a practical 
matter, bring many cases in either the administrative or federal forum while 
citing the same four factors as support for its decision.103  As a practical 
matter, it is easy to understand why the Commission might not want to 
constrain its prosecutorial discretion.  However, the price of this policy is 
inevitable (and understandable) criticism over the SEC’s lack of precision 
in offering guidance. 
Second, the Commission has amended its Rules of Practice,104 primarily 
to allow for a limited number of depositions and to provide additional time 
for preparation in administrative proceedings.105  With respect to 
depositions, the Commission’s new Rules of Practice permit the staff and 
respondents to take up to three depositions each in single-respondent cases 
 
 102. Hanusik et al., supra note 101. 
 103. See, e.g., Randall J. Fons, Administrative Proceedings vs. Federal Court:  The SEC 
Provides Limited Transparency into Its Choice of Forum, MORRISON FOERSTER (May 11, 
2015), http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/05/150511SECChoiceof 
Forum.pdf (“[W]ith the open-ended nature of the guidance, there is little to prevent the 
Division from choosing whatever forum it finds most advantageous.”) 
[https://perma.cc/VHL7-RLMR]. 
 104. See generally SEC Final Rules, supra note 55.  For examples of critiques of the 
Commission’s amended Rules of Practice, see Margaret A. Dale & Mark D. Harris, SEC 
Adopts Amendments to Rules for Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 10, 2016), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202764688801/SEC-Adopts-Amendments-to-
Rules-for-Administrative-Proceedings?slreturn=20160813160536 (“While providing 
additional safeguards, the amendments fall short of the broad procedural protections that 
defendants are afforded in federal court.”) [https://perma.cc/UX3Z-8S8V]; SEC Publishes 
Final Rules Amending the Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings, JONES DAY 
(July 2016) [hereinafter JONES DAY], http://www.jonesday.com/sec-publishes-final-rules-
amending-the-rules-of-practice-for-administrative-proceedings-07-19-2016/ (“The 
Commission’s amended rules of practice for [administrative proceedings] are a step in the 
right direction, but they do not go nearly far enough to address the concerns underlying the 
continuing constitutional and legislative challenges to the Commission’s administrative 
process.”) [https://perma.cc/8LN5-HSHD]; CADWALADER, supra note 56 (“The amended 
Rules of Practice are a step in the right direction for administrative proceedings, but they are 
by no means equivalent to the degree of constitutional and procedural protections afforded 
civil defendants who find themselves in federal district court.”); see also Why the SEC’s 
Proposed Changes to Its Rules of Practice Are Woefully Inadequate—Part I, SEC. DIARY 
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/10/08/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-
rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-i/ (“[T]his proposal represents so feeble an 
effort at modernizing the Commission’s dated Rules of Practice that only one judgment is 
justified.  If the provision of fair and ‘due’ process to respondents in these actions is the 
standard, the Commission’s grade is an ‘F+.’  If providing a reasoned and rational 
explanation for the proposals is the standard (i.e., do they pass muster under the 
Administrative Procedure Act), the Commission’s grade is an ‘F.’”) [https://perma.cc/ 
9MDP-EACL]; Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to Its Rules of Practice Are Woefully 
Inadequate—Part II, supra note 61 (suggesting that the Commission’s proposed discovery 
rule “provides a textbook case of arbitrary and capricious rulemaking”); Quaadman 
Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 7–8 (suggesting that the proposed three to five deposition 
limit is arbitrary and capricious because it “does not appear to be related to the number of 
persons that are deposed or interviewed in a typical investigation,” “to the number of 
witnesses that the division staff typically calls in a litigated proceeding,” or “to the type of 
misconduct that is alleged to have occurred”). 
 105. See generally SEC Final Rules, supra note 55. 
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and up to five depositions each in multiple-respondent cases.106  The Rules 
of Practice also allow each side to take two additional depositions upon a 
showing of compelling need.107  Depositions are permitted only in the 
longest, most complex cases; parties in other types of proceedings are not 
permitted to notice depositions.108 
Criticism of this new approach was swift and sharp.109  To be sure, five 
or seven depositions are better than none, but critics ask where the magic 
numbers of five and seven come from.  What is the basis for these 
limitations, or are they arbitrary and capricious?110  And, not only are five 
and seven a small number of depositions in complex matters, “but figuring 
out which witnesses to depose may involve a large degree of guesswork if 
the agency took testimony from a number of people in its investigation, as 
is often the case.”111  Further, in cases involving multiple respondents, 
disputes can arise among the respondents as to which witnesses should be 
deposed:  some witnesses are likely to be more helpful or damaging to some 
respondents than to others.112  Instead of limiting the number of depositions 
according to a predetermined range, critics recommend that the Rules of 
 
 106. See id. at *8–11.  There is no separate provision for expert witness depositions.  The 
three to five depositions permitted by the amended rules must therefore include both fact and 
expert witnesses. Id. 
 107. See id. at *10–11. 
 108. See id. at *9. 
 109. See, e.g., JONES DAY, supra note 104 (noting that the “limits on depositions in the 
amended rules remain arbitrary and formulaic” and that “providing ‘equivalent’ discovery—
such as the same number of depositions—to the respondent and to the Division of 
Enforcement during the pendency of an [administrative proceeding] does nothing at all to 
address the immense informational imbalance in the Commission’s favor following the 
investigatory phase, when the Commission’s power to discover and depose is virtually 
unlimited, while the respondent’s ability to do the same hardly exists”); CADWALADER, 
supra note 56 (noting that “the limited number of depositions permitted is likely insufficient 
to have much impact on larger scale investigations involving numerous actors or multiple 
jurisdictions”).  Some have critiqued the Commission’s proposed amendments to Rule of 
Practice 233, which would have extended the number of depositions in complex cases to 
three for single-respondent cases and five for multirespondent cases without any opportunity 
to seek additional depositions. See Richard Foster, Senior Vice President and Senior Counsel 
for Regulatory and Legal Affairs, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rule:  Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice 3 (Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter 
Foster Comment Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-7.pdf (“The 
restricted number of depositions for respondents is prejudicial.”) [https://perma.cc/ 
JMV2-H6R4]; Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 6–9 (arguing that the proposed 
change in prehearing depositions is deficient in a number of respects and does not level the 
playing field); Henning, supra note 71 (“[A]llowing only three—or at most five—
depositions seems like an artificially low limit that will not do much to aid those accused of 
a violation in a complex case.”); see also Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to Its Rules of 
Practice Are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, supra note 61 (arguing that the proposed rules 
“allow an arbitrary number of depositions that is divorced from any analysis of what cases 
really require, and from any recognition that these are far from ‘one size fits all’ cases”). 
 110. See supra note 104. 
 111. Henning, supra note 71.  
 112. See, e.g., JONES DAY, supra note 104 (noting that in multirespondent cases, “some 
respondents may find themselves left out, with no guaranteed method to explore the factual 
allegations against them”). 
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Practice be flexible and give ALJs discretion to increase the number of 
depositions each party can take.113 
In its defense, the Commission might observe that many other federal 
agencies do not permit any depositions as part of the hearing process114 and 
that depositions are not available in criminal proceedings without a court 
order and only then in exceptional circumstances.115  From this perspective, 
the Commission could be viewed as more accommodating than its peers.  
That defense does not, however, respond directly to the substance of the 
opposition’s critiques:  the number of permitted depositions remains 
arbitrarily small.116 
The Commission also amended its Rules of Practice to lengthen the time 
period during which respondents can prepare for a hearing and take the 
depositions that the Commission now permits.117  Administrative 
proceedings can “have multiple defendants and may involve hundreds of 
thousands of pages of documents related to numerous clients and 
transactions.  Under the current rules, even the most complex matter must 
be decided within 300 days, with the hearing to begin only four months 
after filing the charges.”118  Under the new rules, a hearing can begin as late 
as ten months after the filing of the charges in the most complex matters.119  
 
 113. See, e.g., Aegis J. Frumento & Stephanie Korenman, Partners, Stern Tannenbaum & 
Bell, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule:  Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of 
Practice 2 (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-11.pdf 
(“[R]ather than limit the number of permissible depositions by Rule, it would be fairer to 
empower the Hearing Officer to allow depositions in the interests of justice upon a proffer of 
need, even if it results in more than three or five.”) [https://perma.cc/U5SB-5TU2]; id. at 3 
(“[T]o give the Staff the same right to depositions as Respondents just perpetuates the one-
sidedness of the Commission’s administrative proceedings, under a false guise of even-
handedness.”); Theodore B. Olson, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Comment Letter 
on Proposed Rule:  Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice 6–7 (Dec. 4, 2015) 
[hereinafter Olson Comment Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y5FL-ERP8]. 
 114. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 663 F.3d 476, 487 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that “[d]iscovery typically is not available in APA cases”); Grant v. 
Sullivan, No. 88-0921, 1989 WL 1829075 (M.D. Penn. July, 27 1989) (noting “the absence 
of a discovery mechanism during agency proceedings in Social Security disability cases”); 
Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror:  Discovery in Immigration Court, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 1569, 1582 (2014) (noting that the governing rule in immigration 
proceedings “seems to only contemplate ‘evidence depositions’ to preserve testimony for a 
hearing, rather than ‘discovery depositions’ to learn about witnesses before trial”).  
 115. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1) (“A party may move that a prospective witness be 
deposed in order to preserve testimony for trial.  The court may grant the motion because of 
exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice.”); see also United States v. Kelley, 
36 F.3d 1118, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[Rule 15] permits depositions in criminal cases to be 
taken only by order of the court, and then only in ‘exceptional’ situations.”); United States v. 
Grado, 154 F. Supp. 878, 879 (W.D. Mo. 1957) (“Unlike the practice in civil cases in which 
depositions may be taken as a matter of right by notice without permission of the court, 
[Rule 15] permits depositions to be taken only by order of the court.”). 
 116. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 117. See SEC Final Rules, supra note 55. 
 118. Henning, supra note 71. 
 119. See SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *54.  Prior to the recently adopted 
amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice, Rule 360 required the Commission to designate 
the time period for preparation of the initial decision as either 120, 210, or 300 days from the 
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Again, while this extension of time is an advance over the current state of 
affairs, critics complain that the prehearing discovery period remains 
“extremely short,”120 particularly when measured against the time periods 
involved in comparably complex federal litigation.  These rule changes also 
do not address a fundamental asymmetry in the administrative process.  As 
previously observed, the Commission’s staff often will have had years with 
which to prepare its case and take witness testimony, while respondents 
remain subject to a “rocket docket”—though less “rocket” than in the 
past—that forces them to prepare for trial within a relatively short time 
frame.121  Here too, critics recommend that the Rules of Practice permit the 
ALJ “to depart from the default timelines wherever the complexity or other 
circumstances of the case reasonably justify such a departure.”122 
In its defense, the Commission can continue to argue that respondent 
counsel can, on occasion, “shadow” the SEC’s investigation and obtain 
additional information well before the issuance of the formal order 
 
date of service of the order instituting proceedings. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (2016); 
see also supra note 57.  Under Amended Rule 360, the Commission must designate the time 
period for preparation of the initial decision as 30, 75, or 120 days from the completion of 
posthearing or dispositive motion briefing or a finding of a default. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 201.360(a)(2); see also SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *5.  Amended Rule 360 also 
adjusts the time periods during which the administrative hearing must begin. See id.  The 
newly extended ten-month prehearing period applies only to the 120-day proceedings. See 
id.  The new rules provide for an outer limit of six months for the hearing to commence in 
less complex seventy-five-day matters, and an outer limit of four months in thirty-day 
matters. See id. at *6. 
 120. See Joshua M. Newville & Jonathan E. Richman, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules 
Governing Its Administrative Proceedings, NAT’L L. REV. (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-adopts-amendments-to-rules-governing-its-
administrative-proceedings [https://perma.cc/N4BC-NKRN].  For criticisms directed at the 
Commission’s proposed rule, which would have extended the prehearing discovery period in 
complex cases for up to eight months, see Foster Comment Letter, supra note 109, at 3, 
noting that the proposed time limit was “too short and unrealistic,” and Henning, supra note 
71, stating that “the time in which an administrative case would be completed is still fairly 
short.” 
 121. See supra notes 57–58; see also CADWALADER, supra note 56 (“Additional 
prehearing preparation time and a limited ability to depose witnesses hardly compares to the 
fact that the Enforcement Division has virtually unlimited discovery opportunities during the 
course of an investigation (for example, during SEC investigative testimony, only the SEC 
counsel and the witnesses’ counsel are present, and the target of the investigation cannot 
even attend—much less examine—a witness or object to the questions asked).”). 
 122. See e.g., Olson Comment Letter, supra note 113, at 3; see also JONES DAY, supra 
note 104 (“[D]ue process demands that procedural rules provide for the ability to tailor such 
limits to the facts and complexities of a particular enforcement action.  This is especially true 
with many Commission enforcement actions, which can involve accounting, financial, and 
trading and markets issues far more intricate and complex than many cases litigated in 
federal court.”); Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 10–11 (recommending that 
the proposed language be revised to enable the ALJ, for good cause, to extend the period 
between the filing of the order instituting proceedings and the commencement of the 
hearing); David M. Zornow et al., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Comment 
Letter on Proposed Rule:  Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice 4 (Dec. 4, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-6.pdf (“[D]ecisions as to the 
appropriate number of depositions and timing for the hearing should be left to the discretion 
of the adjudicators who are presumably most familiar with the issues and needs of any 
particular case.”) [https://perma.cc/C9DH-8CCM]. 
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instituting proceedings.123  In these instances, the burden imposed by the 
SEC’s timetable might not be as onerous as critics suggest.  However, if the 
respondent is, for any reason, unable to effectively “shadow” the 
investigation,124 the burden of even the new, lengthened timetable can be 
substantial.  This distinction perpetuates, but ameliorates, a preexisting 
inequity in the Commission’s hearing procedures:  respondents who have 
the ability to “shadow” are less disadvantaged by the Commission’s 
timelines and discovery restrictions than respondents who, for any reason, 
lack that capacity. 
The Commission also amended its evidentiary rules to formally exclude 
“unreliable” evidence and to clarify that “hearsay may be admitted if it is 
relevant, material, and bears satisfactory indicia of reliability so that its use 
is fair.”125  Commenters were quick to observe that this standard makes 
“what is already an unfair aspect of [administrative] proceedings even 
worse” by “codify[ing] the ALJ practice of treating investigative transcripts 
as a reliable form of ‘sworn statement’” and by “codify[ing] the 
acceptability of hearsay evidence more generally, apparently without regard 
to a realistic examination of reliability.”126  Indeed, under the SEC’s new 
rule, “some out-of-court statements, like the investigative testimony of 
witnesses, could be considered without having to call them to attend the 
hearing, which avoids the risk they might say something different or lose 
credibility on cross examination.”127  Even under the new rules, the small 
number of depositions available to respondents can be viewed as especially 
troubling in light of the prospect of dozens of potential investigative 
witnesses having their testimony admitted without the respondent having 
any right to depose or cross-examine, particularly in large, complex 
matters.128  Commenters instead advocate for Rules of Practice that mirror 
the Federal Rules of Evidence with regard to the admission of hearsay.129 
 
 123. See Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4. 
 124. See supra note 62. 
 125. SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *54. 
 126. Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to Its Rules of Practice Are Woefully 
Inadequate—Part IV, SEC. DIARY (Dec. 3, 2015), https://securitiesdiary.com/2015/12/04/ 
why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-iv/ 
[https://perma.cc/E73T-CXAG]. 
 127. Henning, supra note 71. 
 128. See, e.g., Barry R. Goldsmith, SEC Proposed Amendments to Rules for 
Administrative Proceedings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 15, 
2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/15/sec-proposes-amendments-to-rules-for-
administrative-proceedings/ (“[I]n complex cases, which the Commission has increasingly 
authorized to proceed in its in-house courts, three or five depositions per side could be 
woefully inadequate . . . the proposed changes deny respondents the ability to depose all 
critical witnesses in complex cases, which generally exceed three or five in total.”) 
[https://perma.cc/2LHL-RAAM]. 
 129. See, e.g., Foster Comment Letter, supra note 109, at 3 (arguing that “[t]he admission 
of hearsay evidence should be consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence”); Olson 
Comment Letter, supra note 113, at 8 (“[T]he Rules of Practice should prohibit the 
admission of hearsay, subject to the various hearsay exceptions recognized under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.”); see also Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 11–12 (arguing 
that the proposed rule does not go far enough in restricting hearsay, and recommending that 
the proponent of hearsay evidence be required to justify its admission with factual evidence 
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The Commission defends its new approach by observing that its standard 
is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act130 and by expressing 
the view that “a case-by-case determination of the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence is more appropriate than the broad exclusionary rules and 
procedures” proposed by critics of the new rule.131 
In the aggregate, as a leading legal columnist writing for the New York 
Times has observed, these measures are “at best small steps in responding to 
criticism about truncated rights.”132  To be sure, the Commission can 
respond to these criticisms by further liberalizing its rules to allow ALJs to 
set any number of depositions and to allow additional forms of discovery.  
The Commission also could lengthen the calendar for proceedings before 
ALJs, harmonize its evidentiary rules with the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and do a better job of following its own internal guidelines regarding the 
resolution of appeals.  But even if these reforms are forthcoming, critics are 
unlikely to be fully appeased.133 
 
establishing the “reliability of the proposed testimony and demonstrating that its admission 
will not abridge the opposing party’s right to effective cross-examination”). 
 130. See SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *26. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Henning, supra note 9.  
 133. In addition to the changes already noted, the Commission’s new Rules of Practice 
alter the requirements for serving an order instituting proceedings (OIP) on a person in a 
foreign country (Rule 141); “allow a stay pending Commission consideration of settlement 
offers to also stay the timelines set forth in Rule 360” (Rule 161); “allow the Commission or 
a hearing officer to exclude or summarily suspend a person for any portion of a deposition, 
as well as the proceeding, a conference, or a hearing” (Rule 180); require a respondent to 
state in its answer to an OIP “whether the respondent is asserting any avoidance or 
affirmative defenses, including but not limited to res judicata, statute of limitations, or 
reliance” (Rule 220); add depositions, expert witness disclosures or reports, the timing for 
completion of production of documents, and the filing of any dispositive motion pursuant to 
Rule 250 to the list of subjects to be discussed at the prehearing conference (Rule 221); 
require a party calling an expert witness to provide a brief summary of the expert’s expected 
testimony, a statement of the expert’s qualifications, a list of other proceedings in which the 
expert has opined during the previous four years, and a list of publications authored by the 
expert during the previous ten years (Rule 222); “provide that the Division may redact 
certain sensitive personal information from documents that will be made available, unless 
the information concerns the person to whom the documents are being produced,” and “to 
clarify that the Division may withhold or redact documents that reflect settlement 
negotiations with persons or entities who are not respondents in the proceeding at issue” 
(Rule 230); adopt standards for a motion to quash or modify a subpoena (Rule 232); extend 
the maximum length of each deposition to seven hours (Rule 233); “provide that the moving 
party may take a deposition on written questions either by stipulation of the parties or by 
filing a motion demonstrating good cause” (Rule 234); permit parties, upon a motion, to 
introduce deposition testimony, investigative testimony, or certain sworn declarations (Rule 
235); to amend the list of documents admissible as a prior sworn statement to include 
depositions taken pursuant to Rules 233 or 234, as well as investigative testimony and 
declarations taken under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and to permit the 
use of statements made by a party or a party’s officers, directors, or managing agents, and to 
clarify that such statements may be used by an adverse party for any purpose (Rule 235); 
permit three different types of dispositive motions to be filed at different stages of an 
administrative proceeding (Rule 250); adjust the timing of administrative proceedings by 
designating “the time period for preparation of the initial decision as 30, 75 or 120 days from 
the completion of post-hearing or dispositive motion briefing or a finding of a default” (Rule 
360); and amend various appellate rules and guidelines. SEC Final Rules, supra note 55. 
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III.  THE DATA 
Ideally, empirical analysis of the Commission’s litigation performance 
would shed objective light on this debate and provide clear guidance as to 
whether and how administrative procedures should be reformed.  Life is not 
so simple. 
In particular, it is commonly argued that a comparison of the 
Commission’s win-loss ratios in administrative proceedings and federal 
court litigation should provide constructive insight as to whether the 
Commission has a home-court advantage in administrative proceedings.  A 
material portion of the empirical debate in this vein relies on data gathered 
by the Wall Street Journal suggesting that 
[t]he SEC won against 90% of defendants before its own judges in 
contested cases from October 2010 through March of [2015]. . . .  That 
was markedly higher than the 69% success the agency obtained against 
defendants in federal court over the same period, based on SEC data. 
Going back to October 2004, the SEC has won against at least four of five 
defendants in front of its own judges every fiscal year.134 
From these data, critics reason that the Commission does indeed have a 
home-court advantage and that it brings some actions in-house because it 
cannot win those cases in federal court.135  These data also have been cited 
as evidence of bias in various constitutional challenges to the Commission’s 
administrative law proceedings.136 
The Commission has responded with vigor, describing these claims as 
“garbage” and stating “categorically that [it is] rubbish” to assert that the 
SEC is avoiding federal court because it has an advantage before ALJs.137  
Table 1 sheds light on this debate through an analysis of the outcomes in 
100 litigated matters in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016—through March 
4, 2016.  These litigated matters are limited to disputes in which the 
Commission seeks an original finding of a violation of the federal securities 
 
 134. Eaglesham, supra note 78.  Slightly different data are reported in other articles. See, 
e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Senior SEC Official Calls Claims of Advantage in In-House Tribunal 
“Garbage,” WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/senior-sec-
official-calls-claims-of-advantage-at-in-house-tribunal-garbage-1455922322 (“[T]he SEC 
won against 86% of defendants in contested cases in its own courts from October 2010 
through September 2015—significantly higher than the agency’s 70% win rate in federal 
court.”) [https://perma.cc/QM9V-UFJN]; Mixter, supra note 88, at 73 (adjusting for 
decisions on appeal to the Commission, the SEC’s success rate in 300-day administrative 
proceedings over the last ten years is approximately 91 percent). 
 135. See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 78 (“An analysis by The Wall Street Journal of 
hundreds of decisions shows how much of a home-court advantage the SEC enjoys when it 
sends cases to its own judges rather than federal courts.”).   
 136. These data have been “cited in numerous legal challenges to the SEC system.” 
Eaglesham, supra note 134; see also Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Rules SEC In-House 
Judge’s Appointment “Likely Unconstitutional,” WALL. ST. J. (June 8, 2015, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-rules-sec-in-house-judges-appointment-likely-
unconstitutional-1433796161 (observing that “Mr. Hill in his federal court challenge [to the 
constitutionality of administrative proceedings] cited a page-one article in The Wall Street 
Journal last month that showed the agency enjoys a significant home-court advantage when 
it sends cases to its own judges”) [https://perma.cc/6WY6-HW49].  
 137. Eaglesham, supra note 78. 
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laws.  Federal court subpoena enforcement proceedings, contempt 
proceedings, proceedings seeking freeze orders, and other similar actions 
are thus excluded from the analysis.138  Including these actions in the 
analysis would substantially increase the Commission’s measured success 
rate in federal court. 
Table 1 measures outcomes in trials, summary judgments, and litigated 
admission settlements.  A trial or summary judgment is deemed a victory 
for the Commission if the Commission prevails on one or more claims 
against any defendant in a manner that entitles the Commission to relief 
under the federal securities laws, even if no relief is ultimately awarded.  A 
ruling or verdict for the Commission as to an element of an offense, absent 
a finding that a defendant actually violated a provision of the federal 
securities laws, is not counted as a Commission victory, because the 
Commission would still have to establish the fact of the violation.  Litigated 
admission settlements arise when litigation is initiated (i.e., a complaint is 
filed without a simultaneous settlement), and the defendant later enters into 
a settlement in which the defendant admits to facts sufficient to constitute a 
violation of the federal securities laws.  Situations in which the Commission 
initiates litigation and then resolves the matter with a “neither admit nor 
deny” settlement139 are excluded from the analysis, as are cases that settle 
simultaneously with filing.  The analysis in table 1 is on a per-case basis 
and does not measure outcomes by defendant.140 
  
 
 138. The following types of cases are excluded from this analysis:  (1) cases that settle 
simultaneously with the filing of a complaint (even if admissions are obtained), (2) cases that 
settle with no admissions, (3) subpoena enforcement proceedings, (4) contempt proceedings, 
(5) cases that result in a default judgment, (6) 12(j) actions to delist a company, (7) follow-
on administrative proceedings, and (8) cases predicated on collateral estoppel arising from a 
prior criminal conviction. 
 139. Jason E. Siegel, Admit It!:  Corporate Admissions of Wrongdoing in SEC 
Settlements:  Evaluating Collateral Estoppel Effects, 103 GEO. L.J. 433, 434 (2015). 
 140. Data suggest that the results are unlikely to differ materially if measured on a 
defendant basis. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance:  Behind the SEC’s 
Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 968 (2016) (finding that the Commission 
prevailed against 95 percent of defendants in enforcement actions litigated in fiscal year 
2010, but not subdividing the success ratio for administrative proceedings as opposed to 
federal court actions).  Issues also arise with regard to measuring outcomes in the form of 
“cases.”  For example, in SEC v. Wyly, 56 F. Supp. 3d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), one defendant 
settled with admissions several years after the initial complaint was filed. Final Consent 
Judgment as to Defendant Michael C. French, Wyly, 56 F. Supp. 3d 394 (No. 10-cv-5760).  
Two additional defendants proceeded to trial and were found liable on securities law claims. 
See Special Verdict Form, Wyly, 56 F. Supp. 3d 394 (No. 10-cv-5760).  The Wyly fact 
pattern is counted as a litigated admission settlement and also as a trial victory.  Thus, 
although initially filed as a single case, it is counted twice in table 1. 
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Table 1 
Panel (a):  Litigated Outcomes Including 
Summary Judgments and Admission Settlements 
Year AP DC Total 
FY 2014 14–0 (100%) 22–8 (73%) 36–8 (82%) 
FY 2015 21–2 (91%) 22–0 (100%) 43–2 (96%) 
FY 2016 (to 3/4/16) 0–0 11–0 (100%) 11–0 (100%) 
Total (30 months) 35–2 (95%) 55–8 (87%) 90–10 (90%) 
Panel (b):  Litigated Outcomes Including 
Summary Judgments but Excluding Admission Settlements 
Year AP DC Total 
FY 2014 12–0 (100%) 20–8 (71%) 32–8 (80%) 
FY 2015 19–2 (90%) 20–0 (100%) 39–2 (95%) 
FY 2016 (to 3/4/16) 0–0 10–0 (100%) 10–0 (100%) 
Total (30 months) 31–2 (94%) 50–8 (86%) 81–10 (89%) 
Panel (c):  Litigated Outcomes Excluding 
Summary Judgments and Admission Settlements 
Year AP DC Total 
FY 2014 12–0 (100%) 11–7 (61%) 23–7 (77%) 
FY 2015 19–2 (90%) 6–0 (100%) 25–2 (93%) 
FY 2016 (to 3/4/16) 0–0 3–0 (100%) 3–0 (100%) 
Total (30 months) 31–2 (94%) 20–7 (74%) 51–9 (85%) 
Panel (d):  Litigated Outcomes in Insider 
Trading Cases Only, Including Summary 
Judgments and Admission Settlements 
Year AP DC Total 
FY 2014 0–0 4–6 (40%) 4–6 (40%) 
FY 2015 0–1 2–0 (100%) 2–1 (67%) 
FY 2016 (to 3/4/16) 0–0 2–0 (100%) 2–0 (100%) 
Total (30 months) 0–1 8–6 (57%) 8–7 (53%) 
Panel (e):  Litigated Outcomes Excluding 
Insider Trading Cases, but Including Summary Judgments 
and Admission Settlements 
Year AP DC Total 
FY 2014 14–0 (100%) 18–2 (90%) 32–2 (94%) 
FY 2015 21–1 (95%) 20–0 (100%) 41–1 (98%) 
FY 2016 (to 3/4/16) 0–0 9–0 (100%) 9–0 (100%) 
Total (30 months) 35–1 (97%) 47–2 (96%) 82–3 (96%) 
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These data suggest that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the SEC’s success rate before ALJs and its success rate in federal 
court when summary judgments and admission settlements are included in 
the analysis.141  By this metric, as described in panel (a) of table 1, the 
Commission’s success rate is 95 percent in administrative proceedings and 
a statistically indistinguishable 87 percent in federal court proceedings.  
Including summary judgments but excluding admission settlements, as 
described in panel (b) of table 1, leads to similar results, with the 
Commission prevailing in 94 percent of administrative proceedings and in 
86 percent of federal trials.  Again, the difference is statistically 
insignificant.142 
Only if summary judgments and admission settlements are excluded from 
the analysis does a statistically significant difference emerge.  Then, as 
described in panel (c) of table 1, the Commission wins 94 percent of its 
administrative proceedings but only 74 percent of its federal court 
proceedings.143  These data are comparable to the statistics reported by the 
Wall Street Journal.144  However, from a defendant’s perspective, a 
summary judgment loss is every bit as real as a trial loss.  Indeed, a 
defendant’s summary judgment loss could, if anything, be taken as a greater 
vindication of the SEC’s claim because the court has ruled that no rational 
jury could find in defendant’s favor.145  From this perspective, it makes 
little sense to exclude cases in which the Commission prevails either by 
summary judgment or admission settlement.  Accordingly, the data suggest 
that, in the aggregate, the Commission has no particular advantage or 
disadvantage in federal court or before an ALJ. 
The data do, however, suggest that the Commission’s success ratio in 
insider trading cases is far worse than in other forms of litigation.  As 
documented in panel (d) of table 1, the Commission’s win-loss record in 
federal court insider trading cases is eight to six, or 57 percent.  These six 
losses constitute six of eight, or 75 percent, of all of the Commission’s 
federal court losses over the measurement period.  If insider trading cases 
are netted from the analysis, as in table 1 panel (e), the Commission’s win-
loss record in federal court becomes forty-seven to two, or 96 percent, and 
thirty-five to one, or 97 percent before ALJs.  The Commission is then 
 
 141. The following tests of statistical significance are formally called two-sample test of 
proportions and are calculated using the stata command prtesti. See prtest—Tests of 
Proportions, STATA.COM, http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rprtest.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/9HTG-MG7T]. 
 142. For the statistics in panel (a), a two-sample test of proportions results in a p-value of 
0.24, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero under conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  For panel (b), the comparable p-value is 0.26. 
 143. The p-value of the two-sample test of proportions for the data in panel (c) is 0.03, 
which is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
 144. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 145. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“If the defendant in 
a . . . civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict . . . [the inquiry is] 
whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a verdict . . . .”). 
2016] FAIR OR FOUL?:  SEC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 1179 
faring slightly better in administrative proceedings than in federal court, but 
this difference is again not statistically significant.146 
This finding challenges the claim that the Commission has a home-court 
advantage before its ALJs and that it attempts to exploit this advantage.  
Indeed, if the enforcement division believed that it has the upper hand 
before ALJs, then it would have rationally filed these post-Dodd-Frank 
insider trading claims as administrative proceedings and not as federal 
complaints.  The Commission’s decision to file these cases in federal court 
is thus inconsistent with the hypothesis that the SEC steers its weaker cases 
to its administrative courts. 
The question then arises as to why the Commission’s track record in its 
insider trading litigation has been so uniquely poor.  An analysis of this 
issue opens the door to a broader critique suggesting that win-loss data are, 
in general, unreliable guideposts by which to measure the fairness of the 
Commission’s administrative proceedings. 
As an initial proposition, insider trading cases that proceed to trial reflect 
a strong selection bias.  The strongest cases are prosecuted criminally by the 
Department of Justice.  Once the government wins those cases, the 
Commission can prevail in a civil follow-on action, but, given our counting 
rules, those “easy wins” are not scored as Commission victories.147  At the 
other end of the spectrum, when the Commission has a strong civil case that 
does not attract criminal scrutiny, defendants will rationally settle by giving 
the Commission largely all the relief it seeks.  The easy wins are thus off 
the table, and the cases that proceed to trial are likely to be the most 
contentious matters in which the Commission and defendants cannot agree 
on a settlement.  These bargaining failures often result from differing 
expectations as to the outcome of the case once all of the evidence is 
presented and are more likely to arise when reasonable litigators can have 
differing views as to subjective factors, such as the credibility of witnesses, 
that can be outcome determinative in insider trading litigation.148  
Bargaining failures are also more likely to arise when there is uncertainty as 
to the definition of the law, as is the case in the law of insider trading, 
which is not statutorily defined and which is subject to ongoing dispute, 
most notably over the definition of the personal benefit test.149 
 
 146. The p-value of the two-sample test of proportions for the data in panel (e) is 0.75, 
which is not statistically significant. 
 147. See supra note 138 (noting that follow-on administrative proceedings are excluded 
from the analysis in this Article). 
 148. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 
RAND J. ECON. 404, 404 (1984) (observing “how informational asymmetry influences 
parties’ decisions, and how it might lead to parties’ failure to settle”); Joseph A. Grundfest & 
Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation:  A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 1267, 1327 (2006) (observing that “a lawsuit’s settlement value can be influenced by 
differential expectations, by differential bargaining power (or perceptions of differential 
bargaining power), and by game-theoretic effects that can be difficult to estimate”).  
 149. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 
(2015) (No. 15-628) (“Does the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary to establish 
insider trading under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), require proof of ‘an exchange that 
is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
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Further, the Commission’s “zero-tolerance” approach to insider trading 
generates an institutional incentive to proceed even with weaker cases.  
Indeed, to maintain the integrity of this initiative, the Commission could 
rationally prefer a loss at trial, as a matter of principle, than a settlement of 
convenience that might signal a wavering commitment to its campaign 
against insider trading.  The notion that difficult cases can proceed to trial 
on grounds of “principle,” even if the rational economic decision is to 
settle, is also present on the defendant’s side of the table.  This dynamic is 
effectively illustrated by Mark Cuban’s decision to reject a Commission 
settlement offer that would have cost a small fraction of Cuban’s ultimate 
defense costs when he proceeded to defeat the Commission’s insider 
trading claims in federal court.150 
In addition, the Commission can point to recent litigation failures in the 
administrative forum as evidence that is inconsistent with the argument that 
it has a home-court advantage before ALJs.151 
Selection effects of this sort are hardly rare in the empirical analysis of 
litigation outcomes and commonly make it difficult to interpret win-loss 
statistics.152  Win-loss statistics also fail to adjust for each case’s degree of 
 
valuable nature,’ as the Second Circuit held in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 15-137 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015), or is it enough that the insider and 
the tippee shared a close family relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?”); see 
also Carmen Germaine, Appeals Courts Still Lost in Post-Newman Trading Muddle, 
LAW360 (May 27, 2016, 11:48 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/801331/appeals-
courts-still-lost-in-post-newman-trading-muddle (“The First Circuit’s Thursday decision 
upholding a Massachusetts attorney’s conviction for trading on tips from a golf buddy 
widened a circuit split in the wake of the Second Circuit’s Newman decision . . . .”) 
[https://perma.cc/M6UV-FKGR]; Carmen Germaine, Insider Trading Law Already Clear, 
Feds Tell High Court, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2016, 6:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/824057/insider-trading-law-already-clear-feds-tell-high-court (noting the split 
between the Second and Ninth Circuits concerning application of the personal benefit test) 
[https://perma.cc/K2YJ-4HG8]. 
 150. See Bebo Amicus Brief, supra note 92, at 2 (“Mark Cuban was lucky enough to have 
the resources to fight the SEC’s defective action against him . . . .  Nevertheless, the pressure 
to settle was enormous—the SEC offered to settle his case for a fraction of the amount that 
he spent to clear his name.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Bolan, Jr., Release No. 877, 2015 WL 5316569 (ALJ Sept. 14, 2015) 
(initial decision) (rejecting the SEC’s interpretation of insider trading law and dismissing 
claims brought administratively against a former Wells Fargo trader), review granted by 
Ruggieri, Securities Act Release No. 9985, Exchange Act Release No. 76614, 2015 WL 
8519533 (Dec. 10, 2015); Wolf, Release No. 851, 2015 WL 4639230 (ALJ Aug. 5, 2015) 
(declining to impose sanctions on administrative respondent after finding the respondent was 
liable for aiding and abetting and causing violations of the federal securities laws); Delaney 
II, Release No. 755, 2015 WL 1223971, at *57 (ALJ Mar. 18, 2015) (finding “that the 
Division did not establish that Yancey failed to supervise Delaney and Johnson,” and 
declining to impose any sanctions as to Yancey). 
 152. These difficulties are most extensively developed in the literature that seeks to 
measure the implications of the Supreme Court’s change in its articulation of the standards 
for the grant of a motion to dismiss. See generally David F. Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle 
and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (offering a critical 
assessment of the large body of empirical scholarship examining the effect of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009), on judicial and litigant behavior); Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in 
the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369 (forthcoming 2016) (measuring 
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difficulty.  Consider, for example, the win-loss record that results if each 
case brought before an ALJ is a relatively straightforward matter in which 
the Commission clearly has the upper hand.  A high win percentage for the 
Commission in its home court would then not be evidence of bias at all.  It 
would, instead, be evidence that the Commission brings strong cases in the 
administrative venue.  Simple win-loss data also fail to measure the extent 
to which the Commission receives the relief it seeks.  The Commission can, 
for example, prevail on all substantive claims in an administrative 
proceeding, yet fail to obtain any of the relief it sought.153  While our 
methodology describes this outcome as a Commission victory, the SEC 
could rationally view it as a Pyrrhic victory, or a technical defeat, because 
of the ALJ’s failure to impose any of the sanctions sought.  Moreover, win-
loss data treat all cases as equally significant, when they are not.  Some 
litigated matters reflect small potatoes disputes that have no meaningful 
precedential effects, whereas others address major legal principles that can 
have broad ranging implications for large sectors of the markets.  This 
failure to adjust for the practical significance of each trial result is yet 
another limitation of the win-loss mode of analysis. 
Most significantly, perhaps, the Commission’s historical practice of 
litigating against regulated entities before ALJs, and only rarely litigating 
matters not involving regulated entities before ALJs,154 establishes the 
potential for a profound selection bias.  The types of fact patterns, causes of 
action, and nature of defenses in these cases is likely to differ in a 
systematic manner that cannot be captured by win-loss statistics. 
A focus on win-loss statistics also masks an elephant in the room.  The 
vast majority of SEC enforcement actions, whether filed in federal court or 
as administrative proceedings, are settled simultaneously with the initiation 
of the action.155  These settled actions do not enter into the win-loss 
calculations, yet the most significant effect of the SEC’s actual or 
 
the impact on case quality resulting from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and 
Iqbal, which required courts to apply a higher standard when adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions). 
 153. See, e.g., Wolf, 2015 WL 4639230 (finding respondent liable for aiding and abetting 
and causing violations of the federal securities laws, but declining to impose sanctions). 
 154. See, e.g., SEC, supra note 1 (“Although the Commission also may bring actions 
against [regulated entities] in district court, certain charges and forms of relief applicable to 
registered entities and associated individuals are available only in the administrative 
forum . . . .  When seeking such remedies, it is often a more efficient and effective use of 
limited agency resources to seek those remedies directly in an administrative 
proceeding. . . .  In addition . . . Administrative Law Judges and the Commission develop 
extensive knowledge and experience concerning issues that frequently arise in matters 
involving registered entities or associated persons.”).  
 155. See, e.g., NYU POLLACK CTR. & CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC COMPANIES AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES:  MIDYEAR FY 2016 UPDATE 
5 (2016) (“In the first half of FY 2016, 98 percent of public company and related subsidiary 
defendants resolved SEC actions on the same day they were initiated [concurrent 
settlements].”); Jorge Baez et al., SEC Settlement Trends:  2H12 Update, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING 2 (2013), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/ 
PUB_SEC_Trends_Update_2H12_0113_final.pdf (“[T]he vast majority of cases [brought by 
the SEC] are settled.”) [https://perma.cc/Z7QZ-RX8D]. 
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threatened shift to administrative proceedings may be on the terms of the 
settlements generated in both federal and administrative proceedings.156 
Indeed, the data show a recent, sharp increase in the percentage of settled 
SEC enforcement proceedings that were filed as administrative proceedings 
rather than in federal court.  In particular, in fiscal years 2010 through 2013, 
“the SEC brought more than 65 percent of its actions against public 
company defendants in civil court,” but fiscal years 2014 and 2015 “saw a 
dramatic shift . . . [as] the SEC’s venue of choice became its administrative 
court,” with the Commission bringing only 24 percent of its actions in 
federal court.157  Some observers suggest that these and other data indicate 
that the “SEC’s ability to extract settlements has increased with the 
flexibility to choose its forum provided by Dodd Frank.”158  While it is 
entirely true that the Commission can extract settlements in administrative 
proceedings far larger than the settlements available prior to the Dodd-
Frank Act, it does not necessarily follow that the Commission is using the 
administrative forum as a vehicle in which to bring weaker cases or in 
which to extract higher settlements, all other factors being equal (although 
they are not). 
Instead, defendants in SEC proceedings could rationally prefer to settle 
matters in the administrative forum because the stigma associated with a 
settled administrative proceeding, which typically gives rise to an 
administrative cease-and-desist order, could be viewed as being less serious 
than the stigma associated with a settled federal proceeding, which typically 
gives rise to a federal injunction.  Also, by settling in an administrative 
forum, both the Commission and the respondent eliminate the risk that the 
federal court judge reviewing the settlement might raise objections to a 
bargain that is entirely acceptable to both litigants.159  Thus, a finding that 
 
 156. See infra note 158. 
 157. See NYU POLLACK CTR. & CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 35, at 6. 
 158. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 99, at 39 (“[T]he shift toward administrative 
proceedings has been accompanied by a substantial increase in the SEC’s leverage in 
administrative proceedings.  The average civil penalty imposed on nonfinancial public 
companies named as defendants has increased, both in court and in administrative 
proceedings.  We also show a significant increase in the incidence of cooperation with the 
SEC, particularly for administrative proceedings.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 139, at 446 (“Particularly at a time when federal judges 
have been questioning or rejecting settlements negotiated between defendants and the 
Enforcement staff, the agency has significant incentive to eschew federal court altogether 
and instead finalize settlements by Commission order.”); Peter J. Henning, Behind Rakoff’s 
Rejection of Citigroup Settlement, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (Nov. 28, 2011, 5:14 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/behind-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-s-e-c-citigroup-
settlement/ (discussing Judge Jed Rakoff’s rejection of an SEC settlement with Citigroup 
over the bank’s sale of mortgage-backed securities) [https://perma.cc/JMF7-PQD4].  
Defendants also may prefer to resolve their claims in the administrative forum because the 
penalties for noncompliance with an administrative cease-and-desist order are less 
immediate than the penalties for noncompliance with a federal court injunction.  A defendant 
who violates a federal court injunction can be found in contempt of court and can be fined, 
imprisoned, or subject to civil and criminal penalties. See Paul R. Berger et al., The Total 
S.A. Action:  Are Administrative Orders the SEC’s FCPA Resolution of Choice for the 
Future?, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA UPDATE, July 2013, at 1, 5; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2012) (providing U.S. courts the power to punish for contempt of court).  If a 
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post-Dodd-Frank settlements imposing penalties on unregulated entities 
have migrated from the federal to the administrative forum may reflect 
defendant preferences as much as the exercise of applying enforcement 
discretion.  This observation suggests the existence of a simultaneity issue 
that can vex the analysis of settlement data seeking to discern a cause-and-
effect relationship resulting from the delegation of section 929P(a) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
Taken together, these observations urge extreme caution in interpreting 
win-loss data and settlement statistics in the debate over the fairness of the 
Commission’s administrative proceedings.  Commission opponents 
overstate their case by relying on the Wall Street Journal statistics, which 
omit summary judgments and admission settlements and fail to consider the 
differential results in insider trading prosecutions, as “evidence” that the 
administrative process is biased in the Commission’s favor.160  By the same 
token, Commission supporters overstate their case by pointing to 
statistically indistinguishable win-loss ratios in federal court and 
administrative proceedings as evidence that the Commission’s 
administrative process is fair and needs no reform.161 
Notwithstanding these statistical analyses, it cannot be denied that forum 
selection decisions can be outcome determinative.  Two high-profile cases 
are sufficient to demonstrate this simple but central proposition.  The 
Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Newman,162 sharply limiting 
the nature of transactions that could be viewed as satisfying the Dirks 
personal benefit test,163 would never have resulted from a Commission 
enforcement proceeding.164  Similarly, many federal courts would never 
have agreed with the Commission’s decision in Flannery,165 which 
dramatically narrowed the reach of the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus 
Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders166 and asserted a muscular 
 
respondent violates an administrative cease-and-desist order, the SEC can immediately seek 
civil penalties for the violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) (authorizing the Commission to seek 
civil penalties in district court for violation of a cease-and-desist order).  However, if the 
SEC wishes to pursue contempt proceedings, it must first move a federal court to enter an 
injunction directing compliance with the order, then pursue contempt proceedings for 
noncompliance with the injunction. See Berger et al., supra, at 5 n.38 (explaining that 15 
U.S.C. § 78u(e) grants “courts the authority to issue injunctions commanding persons to 
comply with the securities laws”).  On the other hand, SEC administrative settlements, which 
are typically based on the SEC’s “findings,” can raise potential insurance coverage or 
licensing issues that federal court “allegations” do not. See, e.g., In re Bebo Shows Why SEC 
Administrative Proceedings Have Fairness Issues, SEC. DIARY (Jan. 30, 2015), https:// 
securitiesdiary.com/2015/01/30/in-re-bebo-shows-why-sec-administrative-proceedings-
have-fairness-issues/ [https://perma.cc/4W4D-5NUB]. 
 160. Eaglesham, supra note 78. 
 161. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 162. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 163. The Dirks personal benefit test refers to the standard laid out in Dirks v. SEC, 463 
U.S. 646 (1983). 
 164. See supra note 38. 
 165. Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73840, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3981, Investment Company Act Release No. 31374, 2014 WL 
7145625 (Dec. 15, 2014), rev’d, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 166. 564 U.S. 135 (2011). 
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application of the Chevron deference doctrine to the Commission’s 
administrative decisions.167  Thus, even if win-loss data show no 
statistically significant difference between outcomes in administrative and 
federal court proceedings, the forum selection decision is not a matter of 
indifference, particularly as to the interpretation of contentious areas of the 
law. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING A MECHANISM DESIGN SOLUTION 
THROUGH A SELECTIVE REMOVAL STATUTE 
The debate over the proper allocation of SEC enforcement proceedings 
between administrative and judicial venues, and over the appropriate level 
of procedural safeguards in administrative proceedings, is evidently 
complex.  The battling camps express extreme positions.  While critics 
advocate reforms that would effectively eliminate administrative 
proceedings as a means of resolving many, or even most, disputes,168 
defenders hope that modest tweaks will forestall sweeping reforms.169  This 
Article suggests a middle ground:  a properly crafted removal statute can 
promote an optimal allocation of litigation between the administrative and 
federal forums, while simultaneously creating incentives for the SEC to 
reform its internal procedures in a manner that builds confidence that its 
internal procedures are, in fact, fair and efficient. 
This proposal rests on the observation that it is possible, ex ante, to 
conclude that some cases should rationally be channeled to the 
administrative forum but that others are better resolved in federal court.  
Many cases, however, are not so easily categorized in advance.  For these 
cases, there is a need for a mechanism that allows an objective third party—
not the Commission itself—to determine whether the case should proceed 
in an administrative or federal forum.  As explained in greater detail below, 
a carefully crafted discretionary removal statute can allow the federal courts 
to perform this filtering function in a manner that does not overburden 
federal dockets, does not inordinately delay the resolution of disputes, and 
provides incentives for the SEC to assure fairness and efficiency in its 
administrative proceedings. 
The basic contours of such a statute are straightforward.  As an initial 
matter, the statute would define a category of enforcement actions that are 
assigned to the administrative forum and as to which respondents would 
have no right to seek removal.  For these cases, the current law regarding 
the Commission’s ability to select a forum would remain unchanged. 
While reasonable observers can differ over the precise definition of cases 
that should be designated for this category, several guiding principles can 
inform this classification decision.  In particular, cases that raise technical 
matters likely to be within the SEC’s greater competence, cases that involve 
 
 167. See Flannery, 2014 WL 7145625, at *18, *20–22 (noting disagreements with several 
district court decisions). 
 168. See supra note 23. 
 169. For a discussion of recently adopted amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice, see 
supra Part II.  
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formalistic violations, cases in which the stakes at issue are relatively small, 
or cases that implicate the integrity of the Commission’s internal processes 
(such as the right to appear before the SEC), could reasonably be assigned 
to this category. 
The second category would be composed of enforcement actions that 
must be filed in federal court unless the defendant consents to proceeding in 
an administrative forum.  Conceptually, these cases would implicate 
questions of fact or law that, on a categorical basis, are better resolved in 
federal district court.  Defining this category in advance is more difficult 
than identifying a set of cases that can rationally be assigned to the 
administrative arena.  Indeed, if this categorization decision is based 
exclusively on the empirical analysis presented in Part III of this Article—
which is not the decision rule advocated by this analysis—then only insider 
trading litigation appears to present characteristics that would support a 
presumption that the litigation should be heard in federal court.  However, 
reasonable arguments can be presented to support the conclusion that larger, 
more complex matters should also automatically be assigned to federal 
court.  For example, cases seeking penalties or disgorgement in excess of a 
predetermined dollar amount, or involving a number of witnesses that 
exceeds a particular threshold, also might be required to proceed in federal 
court unless the defendant consents to an administrative proceeding. 
The third category would be composed of cases as to which it is difficult 
to determine, on an a priori basis, whether they are better resolved in 
administrative proceedings or in federal court.  These cases are, effectively, 
the residual that does not fit in either of the first two categories.  For these 
cases, the statute would provide respondents with a right to petition a 
federal court for an order removing the case from the Commission’s 
administrative proceedings and assigning it to federal court.  The grant of 
the order would be at the discretion of the district court judge to whom the 
petition is assigned. 
This process can be modeled on existing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(f),170 which creates a discretionary interlocutory appeal from a district 
court decision ruling on a motion for class certification.  Indeed, the very 
rationale for the adoption of Rule 23(f) mirrors the rationale for the 
adoption of a removal statute.  Rule 23(f)’s drafters recognized that the 
class certification decision can, as a practical matter, be outcome 
determinative without regard to the merits of the underlying action.171  
 
 170. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 171. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 565 
(1996).  Addressing proposed revisions to Civil Rule 23(f), the Advisory Committee noted 
that 
[a]n order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in which 
the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment on the 
merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of 
litigation.  An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a 
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run 
the risk of potentially ruinous liability.  These concerns can be met at low cost by 
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Granting the courts of appeal a discretionary right to engage in interlocutory 
review therefore promotes the interests of justice.172  By the same token, if 
there is concern that the decision to proceed as an administrative matter is 
also outcome determinative, then it is also reasonable to provide for a third 
party review of that decision.  The most reasonable third party reviewer is 
the federal district court that would hear the matter if it was not committed 
to the administrative process. 
The district court’s decision whether to grant the proposed removal 
petition should not be standardless.  To provide guidance for court and 
litigants, the statute could define a set of “core factors” that would govern 
the district court’s consideration of removal motions, much as the courts 
have evolved “core factors” that govern Rule 23(f) proceedings.173  These 
factors might include (1) whether the presence of a jury or of an Article III 
judge as a fact-finder would materially promote the interests of justice; (2) 
whether the litigation involves a level of factual complexity that is more 
equitably resolved through the application of the discovery and evidentiary 
rules applied in federal court than through the application of the procedural 
rules that govern the Commission’s administrative proceedings; (3) whether 
the litigation involves the application of a substantively complex regulatory 
regime that is better addressed by an ALJ than by a jury or by an Article III 
judge; (4) whether the implications of the remedy sought by the 
Commission are sufficiently substantial that federal court proceedings are 
more appropriate; (5) whether the litigation presents questions of law that 
would benefit from resolution by the federal judiciary, rather than by the 
Commission seeking Chevron deference to its interpretation of the federal 
securities laws; (6) whether the respondent is a regulated entity; and (7) 
whether the federal court’s docket is such that the efficient administration 
of justice calls for resolution of the matter in the administrative forum. 
Simply articulating a three-part statutory categorization along with “core 
factors” to guide the courts in exercising their removal discretion in the 
third category of litigation would be insufficient to operationalize the 
statute because a host of technical matters remain to be addressed.  In 
particular, the statute would have to (1) designate a time period within 
which the petition would have to be filed, (2) identify the district court(s) in 
which petitions may be filed, (3) explain whether administrative 
proceedings are stayed while the district court considers the petition, (4) 
explain whether a petition is deemed denied or granted if the district court 
fails to reach a decision within a stated time period or whether the district 
court has an unlimited time period during which to consider a petition, and 
(5) address whether there is a presumption for or against granting the 
 
establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant interlocutory 
review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues. 
Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. For an example of a discussion of the core factors applied in the consideration of 
petitions invoking Rule 23(f), see Tanner Franklin, Rule 23(f):  On the Way to Achieving 
Laudable Goals, Despite Multiple Interpretations, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 412, 417–430 (2015). 
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petition or whether no such presumption exists.  The resolution of these 
technical considerations could obviously have an important influence on the 
frequency with which removal petitions might be granted.  For example, if 
the statute establishes a presumption against the grant of a petition and 
states that petitions shall be deemed denied unless granted within four 
weeks of filing, then the probability of removal would be lower than if the 
statute establishes a presumption in favor of the grant and states that the 
petition shall be deemed granted unless denied within four weeks of filing.  
The devil, as is often the case, is in the details. 
It bears emphasis that the goal of this discretionary removal provision is 
not to cause a massive migration of litigation from the SEC’s administrative 
process to the federal courts.  The discretionary removal statute 
contemplated by this proposal can be crafted so that its primary effect is to 
present the SEC with powerful incentives to reform its internal procedures 
so that the federal courts do not feel compelled to grant removal petitions 
with great frequency.  Indeed, to the extent that a removal statute stimulates 
the Commission to reform its internal processes so that they are perceived 
as fair and efficient by the courts and by Congress, and not just by the 
Commission, removal legislation can promote the interests of justice 
without overburdening the federal court dockets. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission faces a storm of criticism over the fairness of its 
internal administrative proceedings.  It also faces criticism over its efforts to 
expand the number of cases brought as administrative proceedings and not 
filed in federal court.  This criticism is amplified by concern that the SEC 
seeks to control the evolution of the federal securities laws by insisting on 
Chevron deference to its litigated administrative decisions while 
simultaneously limiting the number of occasions on which the federal 
courts will be able to interpret federal securities laws. 
The Commission can respond to many of these concerns by changing its 
internal policies, and recently adopted amendments to the Commission’s 
Rules of Practice174 indicate that the Commission is not deaf to these 
concerns.  But these internal reforms may be insufficient to address broader 
concerns over the operation of the Commission’s administrative 
proceedings.  Properly designed legislation that grants respondents in some 
SEC enforcement proceedings the right to petition for removal to federal 
court can provide powerful incentives for the Commission to reform its 
internal procedures so that they are perceived as fair and efficient by 
Congress and the courts, not just by the Commission.  The same legislation 
can also clearly define categories of cases that must be filed as 
administrative proceedings and cases that must be brought in federal court, 
thereby further reducing concern that the Commission is directing litigation 
to the administrative forum for an improper purpose.  Properly structured, 
such a discretionary removal statute may well be the best available design 
 
 174. See SEC Final Rules, supra note 55. 
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mechanism for resolving the current policy debate over the fairness and 
efficiency of the Commission’s administrative proceedings. 
